


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25 JUNE 1991



JPRS Report

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Arms Control

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Foreign Ministry on French Arms Control Initiative
OW0606082691 Beijing XINHUA in English
0818 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Beijing, June 6 (XINHUA)—China is now seriously studying France's initiative on global arms control and disarmament, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

The spokesman made the remarks at a press conference when asked to comment on France's initiative and announcement to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The spokesman said China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

However, he added, before these goals are achieved, China in principle endorses the adoption of fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced measures to prevent the proliferation of these weapons. And China has formulated policies and measures concerning this issue.

China pursues the policy of neither standing for, nor encouraging, nor engaging in nuclear proliferations, nor helping others in developing nuclear weapons, he said, adding China participated in the fourth review conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the capacity of an observer last year.

UN Proposes Guidelines for Iraq Arms Embargo
OW0706011291 Beijing XINHUA in English
0006 GMT 7 Jun 91

[Text] United Nations, June 6 (XINHUA)—UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar has proposed a set of guidelines to ensure implementation of the arms embargo against Iraq.

The guidelines covers all types of arms, including conventional, biological, chemical and all nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon-usable materials, as well as ballistic missiles with a range of 150 kilometers and any spare parts and components of these weapons.

The UN chief proposed these guidelines in a report to the Security Council in line with Resolution 687, which decides that all states should continue to prevent the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related materiel of all types.

The guidelines also prohibit all research, development and facilities for manufacturing or repairing weapons, and forbid Iraq from acquiring the appropriate technology and personnel for design, development, manufacture, use or maintenance of such weapons.

The proposal also sets out the mechanism for monitoring the arms sanctions. In order to do this, a UN committee will be set up as an organ for the council to keep track of any arms sale to Iraq.

The UN chief recommended in the report that all countries should report to him within 45 days after the guidelines have been approved by the council.

He also calls upon all countries to cooperate with each other bilaterally or within the framework of existing regional arrangements to make the arms embargo against Iraq air-tight.

These guidelines have to be submitted to the Security Council for approval.

Baker, Bessmertnykh Geneva START Talks Reported
OW0806034391 Beijing XINHUA in English
0024 GMT 8 Jun 91

[Text] Geneva, June 7 (XINHUA)—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh expressed strong desires here today to conclude a strategic arms treaty as soon as possible and to pave the way for a summit meeting between President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev later this month or early July.

Both foreign ministers stressed, however, that a lot of work had to be done before an accord in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) could be reached.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Bessmertnykh, meeting for the second time within a week, devoted most of their time on how to push the START talks forwards.

Negotiations of the START treaty became a top priority for the United States and the Soviet Union after they resolved a dispute over the conventional arms treaty. It could be signed at the planned summit meeting if maximum progress was made.

Mr. Baker handed over to the Soviet foreign minister a letter of President Bush to President Gorbachev. Mr. Baker indicated that Bush's letter contained "some new ideas" on resolving outstanding issues of the START treaty, as well as his commitment to working hard to conclude the treaty. Mr. Bessmertnykh responded that the Soviet side would study Bush's letter "very carefully" and would reply soon.

The two foreign ministers, without going into details singled out two or three issues that they believed were critical for the outcome of the START talks.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Bessmertnykh agreed that the work of the two delegations in Geneva should be upgraded and additional experts should be sent to deal with the outstanding issues. They also pledged to "keep a close eye" on the negotiations.

In addition to the START treaty, Mr. Baker and Mr. Bessmertnykh discussed briefly the Middle East peace process, bilateral relations and other issues of mutual concern.

Bush Proposal on Mideast Arms Control Accepted**Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments**

*OW0806090191 Beijing XINHUA in English
0852 GMT 8 Jun 91*

[Text] Beijing, June 8 (XINHUA)—China agrees with U.S. President George Bush's proposal that high-level Chinese, U.S., Soviet, British and French delegates attend the conference on arms control in the Middle East, a spokesman from the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced here today.

The spokesman made the announcement when he answered a question from correspondents on whether Chinese President Yang Shangkun has replied to President Bush that China agreed to attend the conference to be held next month in Paris and why China has made such a decision.

"The Chinese Government agrees with President Bush's proposal which suggested that China, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France send high-level delegates to attend the conference on arms control in the Middle East," the spokesman said, adding that Yang has replied to Bush on that.

It is the consistent position of the Chinese Government that proper, fair and practicable measures should be taken to achieve international arms control and disarmament in a comprehensive and balanced manner, the spokesman said.

"We are willing to study this important issue with all the countries concerned on an equal footing," he said.

U.S. Welcomes Decision

*OW0806003491 Beijing XINHUA in English
0004 GMT 8 Jun 91*

[Text] Washington, June 7 (XINHUA)—The United States today expressed welcome to China's decision to attend a proposed Mid-East arms control conference, the White House said.

White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said President George Bush received a letter from Chinese President Yang Shangkun yesterday, in which Yang said that China agrees to attend the five nation conference on arms control in the Middle East, proposed by Bush on May 28.

President Yang also welcomed the coming visit to China by U.S. State Department Undersecretary Reginald Bartholomew on June 16-18 for discussions on non-proliferation and other security issues, Fitzwater said.

"We are pleased with China's decision to attend the conference," he said.

"This is a positive step that will strengthen international non-proliferation efforts, and indicates China's resolve to contribute to efforts to attain stability in the Middle East," he added.

Britain, France and China have so far accepted the proposal. The conference will be held in Paris in the first half of July, Fitzwater said.

Column Surveys Chinese Attitude on Arms Issues

*HK1006042991 Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO
in Chinese 10 Jun 91 p 2*

["Political Talk" column by Shih Chun-yu (2457 0689 3768): "China's Reactions to Arms Control Proposals"]

[Text] The recent disarmament and arms control talks or proposals have attracted worldwide attention. This is the reflection of the relaxation in East-West relations and the readjustment of international relations following the end of the Gulf war.

Because of its dire need for Western economic aid, the Soviet Union has made concessions to the United States on reducing conventional arms in Europe, and the two sides reached an agreement on enforcing the treaty. This has accelerated the progress of the talks on reduction of strategic arms which lasted nine years. Both sides have sent an increasing number of experts to handle the technical problems. Because of the large numbers of problems, no agreement has been reached between Baker and Bessmertnykh at the talks held the day before in Geneva. Now we have to see Gorbachev's response made after a study of Bush's new proposal.

Arms Control Proposals Made One After Another

Moreover, three partial or global arms control proposals have been made recently which all involve China. China has responded to these proposals one by one, which is conspicuous at least in timing. The three proposals refer to U.S. President Bush's proposal on arms control in the Middle East, French President Mitterrand's proposal on overall control over large scale lethal weapons, and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif's proposal on control of arms proliferation in South Asia.

Bush's proposal includes the five nations including the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China sending senior officials to a Paris conference held in early July to formulate rules and regulations for the export of conventional arms to the Middle East and establishing an information exchange system within the Security Council.

China Against Nuclear Proliferation

China has also exported arms, but the amount of exports is very limited. According to the annual report issued last month by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 1990 world arms sales the United States accounts for 40 percent, exceeding the Soviet Union for the first time. The Soviet Union accounts for 29 percent. France, which ranks third, accounts for 8 percent. Britain, which ranks fourth, accounts for 5.6 percent. Germany, ranking fifth and exceeding China for the first time, accounts for 4.4 percent. China is not even among the first five, and its position would be lower if calculated in the per

capita value. Nevertheless, China has taken a positive attitude toward the Middle East arms control conference. Yang Shangkun wrote to Bush and expressed the willingness to attend the conference.

Regarding France's proposal, China said it is being carefully studied. While announcing the proposal, France declared it will sign a treaty on preventing nuclear proliferation, thoroughly changing the policy of going its own way practiced since the De Gaulle administration. World public opinion has noticed that China will be the only member nation of the Security Council which has not signed the treaty. Regarding the issue, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman made the following response: First, China does not advocate nuclear proliferation nor will it help other countries develop nuclear weapons; and second, since last year China has attended the conferences on preventing nuclear proliferation, in the capacity of observer. This shows that China supports prevention of nuclear proliferation in action and is taking part in the activities related to the treaty, and that the practices are far more flexible than the past. Regarding large scale lethal weapons, China has consistently stood for their complete prohibition and thorough destruction.

Still Chances for Sino-U.S. Cooperation

There are people in the West who have blamed China for providing Pakistan with nuclear technology. China has time and again denied this; and Sharif has requested that the United States, Soviet Union, and China hold a conference on preventing nuclear proliferation in South Asia, which has been accepted by China. The key to convocation of the conference lies in India.

Regarding China's response, the comment of the White House spokesman is: This indicates the positive effect of maintaining contacts with China and the different response which might arise from isolating China. After announcing that the most-favored-nation status will be extended unconditionally to China, Bush has continued to persuade Congressmen. This can be regarded as a new argument. U.S. Under Secretary of State Bartholomew will pay a visit to Beijing on 16 June. Apart from discussing problems existing in bilateral relations, it is believed that convocation of the arms control conference will be an important topic of his tour. In the years ahead, cooperation on a number of issues will be required between China and the United States, two of the Security Council member nations.

DPRK Groups Appeal for Nuclear-Free Zone *OW1106080791 Beijing XINHUA in English* 0653 GMT 11 Jun 91

[Text] Pyongyang, June 11 (XINHUA)—20 political parties and public organizations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) released a joint statement on June 10 demanding the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and the establishment of the entire Korean Peninsula as a nuclear-free zone.

According to the statement, "it is the unanimous desire and aspirations of mankind to live in a peaceful world free from the threat of nuclear war and nuclear weapons. Our republic has regarded the removal of the nuclear threat from the Korean Peninsula as a vital problem that affects the destiny of the nation and as an essential requirement for safeguarding Asian and world peace."

The DPRK has made many sincere efforts to get U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea and convert the Korean Peninsula into a de-nuclearized zone.

JAPAN

Foreign Minister Proposes Hastening CW Pact

OW0606111691 Tokyo KYODO in English 1036 GMT 6 Jun 91

[Text] Geneva, June 5 (KYODO)—Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama on Thursday proposed holding a high-level meeting within the year to expedite negotiations now under way for a chemical weapons [CW] prohibition convention. Nakayama, who is in Geneva as part of a two-week swing through the Middle East and Europe, made the remarks in an address before the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.

"I wish to express the hope... that all the states possessing chemical weapons will make announcements admitting the fact," Nakayama told the gathered delegates. Nakayama said it would likewise give impetus to negotiations on a chemical weapons convention if the states with such a capability would announce their intentions to become original signatories to the proposed pact.

Nakayama said the threat of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the Persian Gulf war has made it more imperative than ever to hasten the negotiations, which he said are "approaching the final stage."

The Japanese foreign minister welcomed proposals for the conference on disarmament to be convened at the ministerial level, saying, "this may be a way to achieve a breakthrough in some of the pending important issues and to expedite the negotiations." Stressing the need for sufficient groundwork to ensure the success of such a meeting, Nakayama proposed that a meeting of high officials of the various countries concerned be held in Geneva "possibly before the end of this year."

Nakayama welcomed France's recent decision to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and expressed a hope that the move would prompt other nonsignatory states to join the over 140 countries now in the regime. He also said that those states which are NPT signatories, but have yet to conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are strongly urged to do so.

Hinting at a cutoff in aid to countries which fail to heed Japan's advice, Nakayama said, "in extending official development assistance (ODA), the trend in the recipient country of the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles will be taken into account." Japan is especially concerned about North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Nakayama said Japan plans to make "concrete proposals" to the IAEA aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. The proposals are to be presented at the IAEA's board of governors' meeting, which begins June 10 in Vienna. Japan is reported to be proposing that the United Nations Security Council recommend special inspections when requested to do so by the IAEA, thus making it harder for target countries to refuse.

Nakayama warned that the danger of regional conflicts breaking out may be increasing as East-West confrontation relaxes and as they become less likely to be regarded as proxy conflicts between the two sides. This new situation, he said, underlines the importance of dealing with the proliferation and transfer of all kinds of weapons, including conventional ones.

The foreign minister spoke of the need for enhanced transparency and openness in conventional arms transfers, arrived at through such measures as establishing a registry system in the United Nations. Such a system, he said, would serve the purpose of an early warning to the international community of a dangerous accumulation of conventional weapons in a certain region which upset the military balance and threatened an outbreak of armed conflict.

Nakayama also called on arms-exporting countries to "improve and strengthen their legal and administrative frameworks for the voluntary restriction on exports of conventional weapons."

Nakayama said Japan intends to submit to the next U.N. General Assembly session a draft resolution that would contribute to the establishing of standards and rules, including a reporting system. He proposed that countries sharing the same idea get together and come up with a joint draft resolution.

NORTH KOREA

Delegates to Kyoto UN Disarmament Conference Cited

SK0106055591 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0433 GMT 1 Jun 91

[“Australian and Japanese Delegates Urge Pullout of U.S. Weapons From South Korea and Conversion of Korean Peninsula Into Nuclear-Free Zone”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 1 (KCNA)—Andrew Mack, director of the Peace Affair Study Centre of the National University of Australia, speaking at the U.N. session on multilateral disarmament held in Kyoto, Japan, called for the withdrawal of the U.S. weapons from the southern part of the Korean peninsula and stressed the need for the United States to give a guarantee of non-use of the weapons against North Korea, according to a foreign press report May 29.

Hiroharu Seki, director of the Institute of International Relations and Regional Study of Ritsumeikan University of Japan, demanded that a nuclear-free zone be established in the Asia-Pacific including the Korean peninsula.

Simultaneous Inspection in North, South Urged

SK0406160591 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1527 GMT 4 Jun 91

[Text] Pyongyang, June 4 (KCNA)—The Korean National Peace Committee and the Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee in a joint statement on June 4 supported and hailed the “1,000-Men Declaration for the Denuclearisation of

the Korean Peninsula" recently made by men of opposition, political, academic, cultural and art circles and environment and health service in South Korea.

The "declaration" of 1,000 representatives of various strata calling for the opening to the public of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and for a simultaneous nuclear inspection in the North and the South of Korea is a very legitimate and fair demand both in view of peace and of national dignity, the statement says, and continues:

As pointed out in the "declaration", more than 1,000 pieces of U.S. nuclear weapons are now deployed in South Korea, posing a constant danger of nuclear war to the Korean peninsula.

In order to prevent a nuclear war and save the nation from a nuclear holocaust at any cost, we have put forward in recent years alone a series of reasonable peace proposals such as the proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, the proposal for holding a multinational disarmament talks for a phased military cutback, a peace package envisaging phased withdrawal of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea and have made every possible effort to put them into practice.

The U.S. Administration, advertising the massive deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea as for "defence of national interests", refused to take steps to withdraw them first, and has gone so far as rudely demanding a unilateral inspection of our non-existent nuclear facilities.

It is an entirely unjust assertion unacceptable to anyone to talk about "defence of national interests" after bringing nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula tens of thousands of miles away from the U.S. mainland. Still more preposterous is to tell us to undergo a nuclear inspection while regarding nuclear weapons in South Korea as "inviolable".

Such brigandish logic can never go down with us who value the dignity and independence of the nation.

If the United States is truly interested in the removal of the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, it should take a decisive step, first of all, to allow the inspection of its nuclear weapons in South Korea and withdraw them.

The Korean National Peace Committee and the Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee, availing themselves of this opportunity, express the hope that the governments, peace organisations and people and personages of all strata of all countries throughout the world will continue to warmly support and encourage the righteous anti-war, anti-nuke struggle of the entire Korean people.

Disarmament on Korean Peninsula Said Urgent
SK0506114691 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1053 GMT 5 Jun 91

["Disarmament Is Most Urgent for Guaranteeing Peace"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 5 (KCNA)—To reduce armament and dismantle mass destruction weapons the most urgent for guaranteeing peace at present, says NODONG SINMUN today in a by-lined article. [sentence as received]

The imperialists are continuing to put spurs on the military expansion and nuclear arms buildup, while invariably seeking wild ambition to dominate the world by force; the article points out, and goes on:

Behind the curtain of "disarmament" in particular, the United States is developing and producing a new kind of nuclear weapons instead of abolishing one kind and is reinforcing Armed Forces in our region while reducing Armed Forces in other region.

A "disarmament" farce staged by the United States is a move for arms buildup to further increase "effectiveness and combat capability" of its Armed Forces behind its curtain while deceiving public opinion at home and abroad.

It is clear that peace is unthinkable as long as the United States continues military expansion and nuclear arms buildup.

Disarmament must be realized at any cost as demanded by the world people.

To this end, it is imperative not to allow the use of valuable success of science and technology and social wealth created by mankind for the production of means of aggression and war.

For disarmament, it is also necessary to ban the test and production of nuclear weapons, reduce existing nuclear weapons and, furthermore, completely dismantle all the nuclear weapons.

What is important for disarmament is also to reduce armament, first of all, in the region where the danger of war is biggest.

It is none other than South Korea where nuclear weapons are most densely deployed and it is the Korean peninsula where the danger of a nuclear war is greatest at present.

The United States has deployed more than 40,000 aggression troops and over 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons in South Korea. South Korea is four times as dense as NATO area in the deployment of nuclear weapons.

The Korean people raise it as an urgent demand related to the destiny of the nation to dismantle nuclear weapons in South Korea.

It is shameful of the United States to talk about nuclear inspection of some country, threatening us with nuclear weapons.

Our Republic has put forward many proposals to realize disarmament and guarantee a durable peace on the Korean peninsula and made sincere efforts for their realization.

The Korean people will realize disarmament on the Korean peninsula with the support of the world people and thus actively contribute to safeguarding world peace.

HUNGARY

Defense Official on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD0306111591 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 0445 GMT 3 Jun 91*

[Excerpts] Our guest in the studio is Gyorgy Keleti, Defense Ministry spokesman. The weekend papers reported that the Soviet troop withdrawal had accelerated. We know the Soviet troops should leave by 30 June, but this deadline was rather uncertain when Horn and Shevardnadze agreed on the withdrawal.

[Keleti] At the end of last year the Soviet troops were ahead of the schedule detailed in the agreement made on 10 March 1990. You must be aware that any difficulty could evolve from weather conditions to, let us say, rail capacity. They have kept this advantage, and at present less than 1,000 soldiers are still in Hungary. The Soviet Army has no more military equipment on Hungarian territory, other than about 130 vehicles to carry out the necessary transportation. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Is it true that the Soviet troops, the Soviet chiefs, do not want the grand farewell, with bells ringing, the Hungarian Government is planning? Perhaps it is unpleasant for the Soviet military leadership?

[Keleti] I can imagine that this is unpleasant for them, for an era will end in their history, but first and foremost in our country's history. I think that the Hungarian people have the right to celebrate this day, this event, whichever day of the month it will be. However, I think it can be understood that the Defense Ministry is striving for a worthy commemoration, a worthy farewell party. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] At what stage are the economic talks? When can we expect an agreement? Can certain economic agreements be signed parallel with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops?

[Keleti] The basic agreement states that both sides should try to complete financial talks by the end of the troop withdrawal. No one can accuse the Hungarian side of doing nothing about this, as we took every opportunity to hold discussions with Soviet experts—committees, or groups of higher-level experts. It seems that our efforts will succeed, because a high-ranking delegation from Moscow is expected to arrive in Hungary in the first half of this month. According to our plans, we can come to a final agreement on the financial aspects of the troop withdrawal which will accord with the interests of the Hungarian Republic. [passage omitted]

Reportage on Soviet Withdrawal, Financial Talks

Talks Begin 10 Jun

*LD1006161391 Budapest MTI in English 1343 GMT
10 Jun 91*

[Text] Budapest, June 10, 1991 (MTI-ECONews)—Talks on the financial and economic balance of the Soviet troops

pull-out from Hungary are planned to come to a close when a final protocol is signed here on June 17.

Bilateral talks on the matter at government commissioner level started in Budapest today, Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, Hungarian Ministry of Defence spokesman, told ECONews this afternoon.

When negotiations on the Soviet army pull-out and its financial implications started last year, the original Soviet claim was for 2.5 billion transferable rubles (50 billion forints) in return for the installations they are leaving behind in Hungary.

"It is quite conceivable that a totally different situation will arise at this round of talks, and the Soviets will reduce their claim," the colonel said.

The position the Hungarian side takes is that the losses Hungary has suffered as a result of Soviet negligence to maintain installations here, together with environmental damage, must all be deducted from the Soviet claim.

The delegations of the two countries are headed by State Secretary Antal Annus for Hungary, and Lieutenant General Viktor Shilov for the USSR, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group now pulling out from the country.

The protocol to be signed at the end of the discussions will lay down the result of these talks, set out what open issues remain, and deal with the question of legal successors vested with the right to continue the talks: The scope of authority of the current government commissioners expires the moment the Soviet troops withdrawal ends.

The very last Soviet soldier will leave Hungarian soil on June 14.

Withdrawal Delayed by 3 Days

*LD1006114791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 10 Jun 91*

[Excerpts] At 1000 this morning, the representatives of the Hungarian and the Soviet Government—that is, Lieutenant Antal Annus and Lieutenant General Silov—started talks on financial issues related to the Soviet troop withdrawal. I asked Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, Defense Ministry spokesman, about the talks.

[Begin recording] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] Is anything known about how long the talks will last and what key issues may develop?

[Keleti] I think this will become apparent by this afternoon. It has already turned out that the last Soviet military train will leave the territory of Hungary not on 11 June but, as the Soviet side announced here at the beginning of the discussion, on 14 June. This train will carry the battalion which has, up until now, been securing the troop withdrawal from the territory of Hungary.

[Correspondent] What is the concrete reason behind the three-day delay?

[Keleti] According to an explanation from the Soviet side, the reason relates to environmental protection. They want to hand over the camp they have used up until now without environmental problems, without environmental pollution. [end recording]

Last Soldier To Leave 19 Jun

*LD1006221591 Budapest MTI in English 1554 GMT
10 Jun 91*

[Text] Budapest, June 10 (MTI)—The last Soviet soldier is to leave the territory of Hungary on June 19, ten days earlier than specified by the Hungarian-Soviet inter-governmental agreement concluded in March last year, Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, told MTI on Monday.

Lieutenant General Viktor Shilov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group, told his Hungarian negotiating partners on Monday that he would be the last Soviet soldier to leave the territory of Hungary on June 19.

The last but one train carrying home the soldiers of the Soviet Southern Army Group left Hungary on Sunday, the spokesman said. For the time being, fewer than 300 Soviet soldiers are stationed in Hungary, most of them at the military camp at Mandok, northeastern Hungary. They are in charge of the projects which have not yet been handed over to the Hungarian side, or directing the transshipment of military equipment at the Hungarian-Soviet border, the spokesman said. They are to leave Hungary with the last Soviet military train on Friday, three days later than originally scheduled. The Soviet command said they needed an additional three days for dismantling the camp and restoring the environment.

The talks which started on Monday are meant to draft the closing protocol for the Soviet troop withdrawals. The delegations are headed by government commissioners, Lieutenant General Antal Annus, state secretary of defence, and Lieutenant General Viktor Shilov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group. The talks are attended by Admiral Yuriy Grishin, deputy minister of foreign economic relations, and Hungarian and Soviet experts, Keleti said.

The government commissioners agreed that the sides would draft the protocol at an expert level this week. The protocol will sum up the tasks fulfilled during the troop withdrawals, and the issues that are still open.

The protocol is to be signed on June 17 by the heads of the delegations.

POLAND

No Barriers to Start of Soviet Troop Transit

*LD0606203491 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1800 GMT 6 Jun 91*

[Text] There are no legal or formal barriers to the beginning of the transit through Poland of the Soviet Armed Forces being withdrawn from the FRG, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says.

A draft of the relevant agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union has already been more than 90 percent agreed upon, and decisions which have not yet been made are not of any crucial nature. That is why Polish authorities gave their consent a month ago for the transit of military rail transports through Poland to begin, even before the signing of the agreement.

ARGENTINA

Cancellation of Condor-2 Project Criticized

PY3105173491 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS

ARGENTINAS in Spanish 0012 GMT 31 May 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 30 May (NA)—The "Lightning" rocket developed by the Chilean Armed Forces and unveiled only 48 hours after the announcement of the Argentine decision to dismantle the Condor-2 project, is not a missile but an artillery rocket with a range of 40 km. It can be used to provide "zone saturation capability, and Argentina has nothing comparable to this rocket."

This report was released today by the Center of Studies for the New Majority [Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoria—CENM]. The report also notes that the rocket "is a tactical weapon system designed for land battle" because it does not have a "self-guidance system."

Horacio Jaunarena, former defense minister under the Radical Civic Union [UCR] government, has stated that "it makes no sense to give up" Argentina's Condor-2 missile project "when Chile, Brazil, and other countries are still increasing their work on this type of project."

He added that the dismantling of the Condor-2 project means that the country "has given up the idea of developing autonomous technology and has decided to be dependent in that area. This will prevent Argentina from achieving its own satellite delivery systems and will subordinate it to the dictates of other countries."

UCR Deputy Conrado Storani, a member of the Chamber of Deputies Defense Committee, has stated that the Chilean initiative "upsets the balance of military power between the two countries."

Storani also objected to the deactivation of the Condor-2 missile, saying that it means that the "Argentine Government has clearly given in to U.S. pressure." He added that the dismantling of the Argentine missile is indicative of "the degree of submission we have reached in our bilateral relations." He also questioned the fact that the Chilean project was developed "without the U.S. pressure directed against the Condor-2 project."

Storani added that the Chilean rocket "should worry" Argentina, "especially now that the Condor-2 project has been dismantled."

He said the Condor-2 and the Lightning rocket "had been discussed" among Defense Minister Erman Gonzalez and "several congressmen" but that during the meeting the

defense minister "did not respond to the concerns expressed to him, limiting himself to promising to meet with the Defense Committee next week. [no closing quotation mark as received]

Storani also deplored the fact that the dismantling of the Condor-2 included "the elimination of the project plans." He added that German, French, and Italian enterprises participated in the project.

Commenting on the fact that in 1989 a U.S. Congress defense committee [not further identified] termed the Condor-2 "a dangerous and destabilizing factor" for Latin America, he criticized the fact that Chile has not received "any kind of threat of economic sanctions" from the United States due to its development of the Lightning rocket.

The CENM has reported that the Lightning rocket "is not a missile nor a strategic weapon, but a free rocket or tactical weapon system to be used in land battle," because "it does not have a self-guidance system."

"It cannot be guided to hit a given target. It is a weapon that is aimed in the general direction of an area. Usually several rockets are fired to ensure that the target is hit; the more shots fired, the greater the possibility of saturating the targeted area," the report notes.

Nevertheless, the report warns that the rocket could have "a substantial land coverage capability" if it is equipped with cluster bombs similar to those used by the United States in the war against Iraq.

The report adds that a missile launcher usually carries between one and eight missiles, while free rocket launcher systems have at least 12 and, in some cases, up to 48 launch tubes.

The report also reveals that Argentina "has manufactured a small number of 105-mm 'Pampero' and 127-mm 'SAPBA' [self-propelled ballistic rocket system] 'self-propelled multiple rocket launcher systems' (SLAM), which are mounted on trucks."

It adds that there is still a prototype of a TAM [Argentine Medium Tank] chassis carrying a multiple rocket launcher system with a range of 40 km at the TAMSE [Medium Argentine Tank Factory, State Enterprise] military factory in the Boulogne area of Buenos Aires.

The report also notes that the only Latin American rocket launcher system that has been used in combat is the Argentine-made "Yarara," with 42 tubes and a maximum range of 11 km. The Argentine rocket launchers were used in southern Nicaragua in 1979.

EGYPT

Foreign Minister on U.S. Mideast Arms Control Plan
NC0606193191 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1545 GMT
6 Jun 91

[Text] Cairo, 6 June (MENA)—Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa said today that Egypt's stand on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction stems from President Husni Mubarak's initiative to set up a demilitarized zone in the Middle East.

He added that U.S. President Bush's initiative regarding this is evidence of his concern over Mideast armament, and that the proposals contained in the initiative are integral and deal with the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons.

Musa said these proposals are being studied in light of the disarmament process so that process is a balanced one, that does not compromise security or give one country an advantage over another.

He said he believes the disarmament issue cannot be ignored because it has international dimensions and global disarmament has become an important issue.

He said: If we turn to the regional aspect of the issue, regional parties must be alert to preserving their interests through balance, parallelism, and important verification measures.

The foreign minister concluded his statement by saying that in general, Egypt welcomes all initiatives on Mideast disarmament, including that of President Bush and the French initiative announced by President Mitterrand.

IRAN

U.S. Mideast Arms Control Plan Assailed
LD0106113491 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic
of Iran First Program Network in Persian

[Station commentary]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Greetings to our dear listeners.

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney arrived in Egypt from Israel yesterday on a new round of visits to the region. During his three-day visit to Israel, he arrived at a series of military-security accords with the Zionist regime's heads; all these center on U.S. commitments to guarantee Israel's long-term security through military support to that country.

Political experts believe that Cheney's visit to the region is an implicit declaration that the political efforts of Baker to establish agreement in the Middle East crisis—aimed at providing long-term security for Israel—met with failure.

The same experts also believe that the timing of Cheney's visit to Israel, coinciding with the Bush plan on limitations on weapons of mass-destruction in the Middle East, underlines a

change in U.S. strategic priorities in the Middle East. According to previous strategy, a political solution to the Middle East crisis is preferred to enforcement of arms limitations; however, at present, in practice, provision for Israel's security through arms limitations has acquired priority.

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, the centerpiece of Washington's policy in the region was to remove the tension in the region. But when its political efforts to solve the Middle East crisis met with deadlock, Washington decided to prevent any kind of tension between the Arabs and Israel. Therefore, it sees the enforcement of arms limitations on the Arabs and also tipping the military balance in favor of Israel under the pretext of arms limitation as the best possible solution. This is because Bush's plan on arms limitation center on banning the sale of weapons of mass destruction to the region's countries. The natural outcome of such a policy is to retain Israel's superiority because she is the only arms manufacturing country in the Arab Middle East. Arab countries import almost all their weapons from abroad; thus, naturally they alone will be affected by the ban. [passage omitted]

U.S. guarantees for Israel's security, together with the delivery of 10 F-15 planes costing \$60 million as military grant in aid to Israel and the provision of 72 percent of the budget for the second phase of research and manufacturing of the Arrow anti-missile missile as well as stockpiling of advanced U.S. weapons in Israel are parts of the Washington-Tel Aviv accord which have been revealed; all these guarantee Israel's decisive military superiority over Arab countries. [passage omitted]

Such a convoluted and devious policy on the part of America has already brought about negative reactions from a number of Arab countries including Syria, who has described that policy as a danger to the Arab's national security. [passage omitted]

PAKISTAN

Editorial Views Prime Minister's Regional NFZ Proposal

BK1006141491 Karachi DAWN in English
10 Jun 91 p 11

[Editorial: "PM's Nuclear Initiative"]

[Text] Even though the Prime Minister's seven-point plan for nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia has drawn a negative response from India, that does not detract from the basic significance of the proposal. By reaffirming Pakistan's long-standing interest in establishing a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] in South Asia, Mr Nawaz Sharif has attempted to leave no one in doubt about our impeccable credentials in terms of nuclear disarmament. Not that Pakistan is an atomic power. But its nuclear programme, which is designed only for non-military purposes, has unfortunately given rise to scepticism in some quarters. Hence, an arrangement which precludes atomic weapons from the South Asian region should reassure the sceptics

who have been displaying a discriminatory attitude towards Islamabad over the matter. Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister implied that his plan was a part of his efforts aimed at resolving Pakistan's difficulties with the United States on the nuclear issue. Relations between the two countries have been at a low ebb since August when Washington suspended aid to Islamabad, pleading technical problems on grounds of Pakistan's nuclear programme and the requirements of the American law.

The implications of the seven-point proposal for Pakistan's bilateral relations with the US aside, the plan deserves to be considered on its merits. True, Pakistan has put forward a number of suggestions from time to time, ranging from the setting up of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia to the convening of a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in the region. Some of them have been incorporated in the latest move, such as the suggestion for inspection of nuclear facilities and signing of the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty]. But what makes the latest initiative different from the earlier proposals is that it combines the bilateral with the multilateral approach. India and Pakistan will be expected to adopt a number of measures together, such as renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, bilateral inspection of facilities and simultaneous acceptance of IAEA safeguards. But there is also a move to approach the issue from the regional perspective. Hence the proposal for a five-nation conference of the two superpowers, China, India and Pakistan. This should deny New Delhi the pretext it has so far been using to avoid entering into any nuclear non-proliferation arrangement with Islamabad. If the question of its strategic balance with China is a major factor in the context of its nuclear option, the best course for India naturally is to thrash out the matter at the proposed five-nation conference or by entering into a dialogue with China simultaneously.

Obviously the issue is essentially one of political will and commitment. Lack of mutual confidence born out of decades of rivalry and mistrust has preempted any agreement on arms-cut and nuclear non-proliferation measures. In this context, a multilateral approach involving others who also have a stake in keeping the region free of nuclear weapons could help create a positive climate for negotiations. It could also result in some agreement if the process manages to generate its own momentum for peace.

SYRIA

U.S. Mideast Arms Control Plan Said To Favor Israel
JN0106140891 Damascus Syrian Arab Republic Radio Network in Arabic 1130 GMT 1 Jun 91

[Station commentary]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It is fair to ask whether the international community, aware as it is of the fact that a continuation of the status quo casts a shadow over regional and global security and peace, has shouldered its responsibilities and whether it has addressed Israel's defiant mood in the appropriate language. It is fair to ask whether the international community has moved to take such measure as

would curb Israel's truculence and spare the Palestinian people daily, savage killings. Will the international community move to uphold fairness and justice as it did in record time regarding the Gulf crisis? Will the international community move to save its credibility now threatened by Zionist arrogance? Aside from expressions of denunciation and regret here and there, the international community has done nothing of the kind. Such has been the futile routine over the past 43 years. Indeed, rather than being faced with deterrent, painful sanctions, Israel is being rewarded with lavish military and economic aid, with Cheney's remarks wooing Israel and undoing Baker's criticism of Zionist anti-peace policies. Moreover, the U.S. initiative to stem the flow of arms to the region meets Israel's interests and fails to take into account the real threat to Arab fortunes posed by Israel's possession of conventional and nonconventional weapons.

Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' has made it clear that the American ideas on keeping a tab on arms supplies to the Middle East would enhance Israel's overall military edge and do untold damage to Arab interests and security. It is common knowledge that Israel is producing weapons of mass destruction as well as tanks, aircraft and heavy artillery, and that the United States will preposition sophisticated weaponry in Israel for potential use in the region. This type of weaponry will be accessible to the Israeli military to deploy in any aggression against the Arabs. His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad has stated over and over that Syria is committed to the peace process and will be amenable to every sincere peace endeavor predicated on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Further, Syria has come out publicly in favor of any plan to declare the Middle East a zone free of all types of weapons of mass destruction and even of conventional arms, subject to the international community moving to assume its responsibilities and end the suffering of the Palestinian people and the Israeli occupation.

The present realities on the ground do not augur well for the future. It is thanks to Israel that peace efforts have stalled. In the final analysis, the U.S. initiative proposing a halt to arms sales was targetted at the Arab states, since Israel is a veritable arsenal of conventional and nonconventional arms. Under such circumstances, Israel can only get more intransigent, aggressive, and hostile to peace. The international community is dutybound to prove its credibility and honor its public commitments. With the Palestinian issue marking time for decades, it is no longer acceptable that the Palestinian people are denied their legitimate rights and that occupation of Arab land continues in contravention of UN resolutions. The first step down the road to a true, fair solution is the enforcement of UN resolutions and the attainment of peace so as to obviate the need for armaments, devote all resources to development, and banish all types of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, and chemical. The high road to a region free of all conventional and nonconventional arms is a fair and comprehensive peace founded on UN resolutions. When the international community sees to the restitution of usurped Arab rights, they will be the first takers of disarmament proposals.

GENERAL

Bessmertnykh Discusses CFE, START With Baker in Lisbon

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments

*LD0306182891 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT
3 Jun 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Excerpts] Moscow, June 3 (TASS)—President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Oslo on June 5 and to Stockholm on June 6 will be of purely working nature, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today. [passage omitted]

Speaking about last week's visits to Rome and Lisbon by Bessmertnykh, Churkin touched upon the results of his talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

Among the chief results of the talks Churkin singled out the fact that the two sides succeeded in getting agreement in principle on issues that remained unresolved following the signing of the conventional forces in Europe treaty.

"One can now say that these issues have been resolved in principle," the spokesman said. "Minor technical details are yet to be discussed. With this end in view, U.S. experts led by James Woolsey, U.S. chief delegate at the Vienna talks, arrive in Moscow today."

Another important accord reached between Bessmertnykh and Baker in Lisbon is the intention of the two sides to focus now on elaborating and concluding a treaty on reducing strategic offensive arms (START). It remains the goal of the two sides to sign the START treaty at the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit, Churkin said. [passage omitted]

Bessmertnykh Comments En Route Back to Moscow

*PM0406141591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jun 91 Union Edition p 4*

[Diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin report: "Productive Dialogue in Lisbon. Results of Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's Trip"]

[Excerpts] Lisbon-Moscow—USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh returned to Moscow on Sunday night, ending his two-day visit to the Portuguese capital. [passage omitted]

Conventional Arms: Differences Virtually Eliminated

A major breakthrough achieved during Bessmertnykh's meeting with Secretary of State Baker was that the differences over the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty signed in Paris last November were virtually eliminated. As Bessmertnykh put it in conversation with journalists in the aircraft en route from Lisbon to Moscow,

"the huge stone which was in our way has been removed; now we just have to agree on certain formulas." In his words, U.S. experts should arrive in the USSR Monday and should begin work the next day with their Soviet colleagues on clarifying the last technical details.

"Problems once emerged because the Soviet Union and the Western countries had different interpretations of Article 3 of the Paris Treaty with regard to land-based weapons within the scope of the treaty," Bessmertnykh said. "As a result of painstaking efforts we were able to find mutually acceptable options which safeguard the interests of all sides and make it possible to observe all levels and sublevels set by the treaty. Considerable progress was achieved during the recent trip to the United States by General Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff. In Lisbon Baker and I managed to remove the last differences." At the final press conference the secretary of state also expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved.

One can conclude from the comments made by U.S. diplomats and journalists that the compromise option the sides ultimately arrived at was somewhat nearer the initial U.S. position than it was to the Soviet position. Neither Baker nor Bessmertnykh, however, went into detail or specified who had made the greater concessions.

Strategic Offensive Weapons Treaty: Several Technical Issues Remain

As for a treaty on strategic offensive weapons [START], in the Soviet minister's assessment, currently "a few purely technical details are yet to be agreed: There are two or three such points, or, if we include quite trivial points, four or five. These points are so technical that not all military men have a clear grasp of what is at issue. Not to mention diplomats. At one of the meetings Baker admitted: 'I understand absolutely nothing of what we've just been saying.' Indeed, diplomats now depend on military technical experts to a very great extent.

"The secretary of state and I," Bessmertnykh said, "agreed that as soon as the work on a conventional arms treaty was over we would concentrate all our efforts on a strategic offensive weapons agreement. If we are able to prepare this treaty for signing in three or four weeks' time (which is physically possible if we have no sleep) there will be a real prospect of staging a summit this summer." [passage omitted]

Bessmertnykh Interviewed

*OW0406023391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1530 GMT 3 Jun 91*

["Diplomatic Panorama"]

[Excerpt] The Soviet foreign minister, Mr. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, speaking in an interview with IF [INTERFAX] Petr Vasilyev.

On the thorny issue of the CFE agreement, the Soviet minister said he and the U.S. state secretary, Mr. Baker, meeting after the ceremony of signing an Angolan peace

agreement in Lisbon, managed to resolve the remaining differences. He spoke of agreement being reached after months of talks to remove a huge stumbling block on the way of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as Europe. A team of U.S. experts, he said, is due to arrive to Moscow later today to speed up work over the CFE agreement.

Mr. Bessmertnykh also said he and Mr. Baker had agreed to focus on the START treaty now that differences over conventional weapons were resolved. START-related issues, he said, will be high on the agenda since early this week. The minister said Soviet and U.S. arms negotiators in Geneva would be instructed accordingly and higher-ranking officials on both sides would be sent there to take charge of the talks on a daily basis.

Disclosing some of the details of how differences on conventional arms were resolved, Mr. Bessmertnykh said "the priority lay in the full observance of the Paris agreement".

He said the sides were at odds over the interpretation of Article 3 related to land based weapons covered by the agreement. Mr. Bessmertnykh said there were two options: One was a legal solution and the other—to adopt some on-spot decisions. "The first one", he said, "meant getting bogged down without a prospect of breaking the deadlock. That's why we opted for solutions which did not breach the agreements reached but secure the interests of both sides."

Mr. Bessmertnykh said several proposals had been gone through together with the Soviet Defense Ministry and chief of staff. He pointed to a recent trip to the United States by General Moiseyev who, he said, had managed to make a headway towards understanding. However, further steps were needed to remove the differences. "Consequently, said the minister, it was through the mathematics of arms movement (tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery) that we managed to create a system which helps to preserve all levels of the Paris agreement." [quotation marks as received]

The remaining issues, mostly technical, said Mr. Bessmertnykh, relate to control and verification measures over the observance of the agreement, which, he said, can be resolved within two days, and already this week.

Asked if there were differences between the Foreign Ministry and the military on this issue, Mr. Bessmertnykh said "It is our common position worked out together with the military." "General Moiseyev wrote a letter to the U.S. chief arms negotiator Mr. Bartholomew which I handed over to Mr. Baker as we met in Lisbon." The letter contains a number of considerations on some technicalities.

Mr. Bessmertnykh said it was cold reckoning by the chief of the Soviet Defense Staff plus diplomacy which helped remove the stumbling block in the way of the CFE agreement.

On a START treaty, the minister spoke of a couple of issues, merely technical, remaining unresolved. He said these were so technical that not even all the military and politicians understand them. These include telemetry or how to count the number of warheads something that both sides are now deeply engrossed in. The minister recalled Mr. Baker telling him in Houston he did not understand what they were talking about. For his part, Mr. Bessmertnykh stressed that "diplomats are entirely dependent for military and technical expertise on this issue."

In his view, technicalities can be resolved at the verification stage while a political solution is needed now. Mr. Bessmertnykh also said he and Mr. Baker had agreed on a string of meetings during joint work over the START Treaty which, he reckons, will be "almost every week". [passage omitted]

Diplomat Evaluates Bush's Mideast Arms Proposals

*OW0506125591 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1800 GMT 4 Jun 91*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] Igor Porshnev asked a ranking Soviet diplomat and expert on Middle Eastern affairs to comment on U.S. President Bush's recent proposals concerning cutting down arms exports to that region.

The diplomat described the proposals as "a very important initiative" deserving a close study "at the inter-ministerial level." He said it had something in common with the suggestions advanced by the Soviet Union in March, notably that a system of collective security be established in the Persian Gulf as a basis for a regional security system for the Middle East as a whole. "Conceptually, the American and Soviet proposals are quite close. We are now studying Mr. Bush's suggestions at length together with the reaction which they triggered in the Arab countries and Israel," the diplomat said.

He called attention to the "delicacy" of a situation in which the five permanent members of the UN Security Council supply weapons and know-how to the Middle East. This, he said, makes it possible to shift from verbal calls to curtail the arms race in the region to practical steps in that direction.

"If this work is ever to be a success," the diplomat continued, "not only the basic suppliers but also the basic purchasers of weaponry must pool their efforts. The arms race in the Middle East is based on lack of political coordination."

The diplomat denied that during Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's recent meeting with Yasir 'Arafat in Geneva the PLO leader "authorized Moscow to act on behalf of the Palestinians." We have never acted on behalf of the Palestinians, Americans or French, and we don't mean to, the diplomat said.

At the same time, he said the USSR was ready to fulfil the agreements reached in Geneva, i.e., to coordinate its efforts with those of the Palestinians, support their work for regional peace, and refrain from advancing ideas that might damage their interests. "The peace initiative which the USSR and USA are jointly trying to translate into reality," the diplomat said, "leaves our ultimate goal unchanged: we want the fair and lawful Palestinian rights to be observed. We are convinced that a comprehensive regional settlement must guarantee equal security also for Israel."

The Foreign Ministry official cited as a "novel element" in the Soviet Union's approach [in] its determination to abandon rhetoric and propagandistic declarations and launch practical efforts to settle the crisis and prepare for holding a peace conference on the Middle East.

West Urged To Help Fund Soviet Disarmament

*PM0906152591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jun 91
Second Edition p 7*

[Yevgeniy Shashkov "View From Moscow": "On the Agenda for the 'Seven'"]

[Text] Leading politicians and diplomats in the USSR and the United States, and also in other major countries, will evidently have to work without taking leave over the next four to six weeks. This summer's extremely tight political schedule is "to blame" for this. Even though there is still no officially confirmed date, people in journalistic and even diplomatic circles are already speaking of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting to be held in late June or early July almost as something that goes without saying.

USSR Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh had talks with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker in the Portuguese capital last Saturday. Shortly before that M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, paid a visit to the United States. Disagreements over the implementation of the treaty on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe, signed in Paris last November, were eliminated during the Soviet representatives' talks with their U.S. colleagues.

I will remind you of the essence of the problems that arose. They were manifested chiefly because of the differing approaches of the Soviet Union and of Western countries to the interpretation of certain articles of the Paris agreement concerning ground-based arms in the treaty's zone of operation. This concerned, in particular, tanks and three Soviet ground troops divisions earlier transferred to the jurisdiction of the Navy's coastal defense. Over the past six months these differences of approach grew to the dimension of a serious problem and became a stumbling block in Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations. At the same time Washington did not hide the fact that both the fate of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and also the future of our relations as a whole depended on the resolution of this question.

It seems to me that there was a certain deliberate "going over the edge" in such a "principled" formulation of the question. In my view, the Soviet troop withdrawal from the countries that used to belong to the Warsaw Pact objectively lessened U.S. interest in continuing the disarmament process in the conventional arms sphere. For, if things were to continue like this in the future, it would inevitably have to be linked with the limitation of the U.S. Navy, and Washington has no intention of resorting to that under any circumstances, since it regards the Navy as a most important instrument of its global influence.

The United States evidently needed the pause in order to see for itself how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go and, at the same time, to demonstrate to us and the whole world "who is who" in the "new world order" that is taking shape. Only it seems to me that the ground chosen for this was not the most suitable. In addition, our partners in the talks were manifestly overdiligent in discontentedly "puffing up their cheeks" in connection with differences of interpretation of the Paris agreements. For, when you get down to the nitty-gritty, it is not all that serious a problem.

Fortunately, common sense triumphed in the end, even in this matter fraught with serious complications. As USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh pointed out in an interview, M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, moved this "stumbling block" during his U.S. visit, and in Lisbon the heads of the two countries' foreign policy departments pushed it further so as to remove it from the road once and for all...

I foresee a question: What good is this to Washington? The United States can live without accords and contacts with us, but would we get by without them? It is not they but we who are going around the world with outstretched hand. All this is so. But there is one circumstance which, in my view, will prompt pragmatic U.S. politicians to seek accords with the USSR, including on conventional arms. They will do this in order to secure the treaty on strategic offensive arms, in order to cut, at least partially, the strategic nuclear arms which remain absolutely untouched. The idea that America's fate lies at the bottom of Siberian missile silos has been rooted in the consciousness of many Americans since "cold war" times. Whether we want it or not, it so happens that U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms have become a kind of materialized reminder that we all really live in an interconnected and interdependent world.

The pause in Soviet-U.S. relations connected with disagreements over the treaty on conventional arms reduction in Europe has, in my view, played not only a negative but also a definite positive role. In my opinion, our partners in the talks process are beginning to realize that the Soviet side will no longer take actions recalling the well-known Caucasian gesture: "Everything on our table is yours!" If our partners in the disarmament process are not rushing into accords with us, we too are beginning to consider whether we need to move at breakneck speed. Particularly as many previous accords have still not been properly assimilated here.

The country today is in such a critical situation that talk of some potential multibillion-ruble benefits from the disarmament process is irritating. Arms reduction must produce real benefits today which will affect the life of the present generation. We have already missed out on a great deal in this sphere, but not everything, and it is not too late to rectify some things. Take, for example, the Soviet troop withdrawal from East Europe.

We would seem to be doing a good thing not only for our own country but for the entire continent, over which the threat of confrontation is ceasing to loom, and a real base will emerge for the creation of a new security structure on a new, more reliable basis. But in practice it is turning out that very heavy blows are thereby being inflicted on the country's economy, which is already suffering as it is, and the destinies of thousands of people are being wrecked. It seems to me that the NATO member countries could allocate funds to finance this action. For they found scores of billions of dollars to cover the U.S. costs in connection with the military actions in the Persian Gulf. After all, the USSR's present actions in Europe are, in my view, more important for the security of Europeans than the war in the Gulf. Why should the participants in the upcoming London conference of the Seven not discuss the possibility of partially assuming the cost of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Europe? Germany has been able to do this.

It is not too late to link the accords reached during the disarmament process on the elimination of military means, including those in accordance with the treaty on conventional arms, directly with agreements on cooperation in the sphere of conversion so as to transform forever the production of tools of destruction into the production of tools of creation. Why should the West not share gratis its equipment and its technological achievements in these spheres? This would indeed make a real contribution to the cause of strengthening peace.

It seems to me that, if leading Western countries were to take this path, then it would be possible even in the next few months to congratulate mankind on the start of its deliverance from chemical weapons, whose greatest arsenals are in the United States and the USSR. Our country is ready in principle to sign this convention. But its realization would be tantamount, for the USSR, to "burning" approximately \$4 billion, to use U.S. estimates. This is the approximate sum that would have to be spent on acquiring the appropriate technology and on constructing special towns and plants to destroy the weapons. Naturally, it is hardly likely that the USSR could afford such expenditure over the next few years without harming the country's budget. Although from the viewpoint of political will we do, of course, favor a convention banning chemical weapons.

Will our giant stocks of these mass destruction weapons, this "poor man's nuclear bomb," as it is called, really continue to hang like a sword of Damocles over mankind? In my view, there is a way out of this complex situation, too. The international community could assist us in destroying it. In particular, leading Western countries

could participate in funding free of charge the development of means of neutralizing toxins, from which it would be possible to derive useful chemical products. Why not discuss this question too during the meeting of the Seven? For the most modern methods of processing chemical weapons into useful raw materials could become the property of all mankind. In addition to the USSR and the United States, approximately 20 other states possess these deadly weapons. Modern methods of processing them could also be used to neutralize harmful waste from chemical production processes—which is extremely important for resolving global ecological problems.

There is no doubt that real disarmament must continue. The treaty on conventional arms reduction will be followed by an agreement on strategic offensive arms. Incidentally, it is already mainly ready. Bessmertnykh and Baker began agreeing on its final details in Geneva yesterday. Understandably, before mankind gets any "peace dividends" from the disarmament process, it will have to pay for deliverance from the danger of war. But what will this price be?

This is the most important question for our country today. Those who will seal the disarmament documents with their signatures must remember that the Soviet people alone, who in the past gave their all to create the military potential, cannot be allowed to shoulder the heavy new burden of eliminating it and demilitarizing the economy. The consequences could be hard. For all this is happening in the lifetime of a single generation.

START TALKS

French Nuclear Forces, Plans Viewed

91WC0114A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 25 May 91 p 3

[Article by I. Volozhanin of IAN [News of the Academy of Sciences]: "What is in the Nuclear Arsenal of France?"]

[Text] The changes in Europe have brought much unexpected trouble for the military planners of many countries. After signing the treaty to reduce conventional arms France, as well as other parties to it, were naturally unable to remain outside the general concerns connected with the necessity of making exceedingly substantial corrections in the national plans for military organization development. If the process of reducing confrontation on the continent can be successfully consolidated, the French parliament will, in the fall of this year, adopt a new military program for the country for 1992-96 that is more moderate in the realm of conventional forces.

The nuclear arsenal of France is not comparable to the Soviet or American arsenals in its quantitative parameters. Specialists feel, however, that it offers sufficient destructive power, allowing Paris to play an important role in the building of new security structures in Europe. The country, according to data from the newspaper LE MONDE, currently has on the order of 430 nuclear warheads on

strategic delivery vehicles (the USSR and the United States have 10,000-14,000 units each), 90 substrategic air-launched missiles and 30 surface tactical missiles. And even though the country's leaders adhere, as before, to the view that the French nuclear weapons cannot be the subject of negotiations, and first and foremost with the members of the "nuclear club," Paris cannot close its eyes to the changes that are happening in that "club." Be that as it may, the significance of that potential has already grown, allowing for the elimination of the Soviet and American intermediate-and short-range missiles, and will increase even more in the event of the expected major reductions in the strategic offensive weapons of both powers.

The fate of the 18 S-3 missiles in silos on the Albion plateau, fitted with one-megaton nuclear warheads, is currently at the center of the debate surrounding the future national policy of nuclear force development in France. Their possible destruction by the year 2000 will actually signify the rejection of one of the components of the French strategic triad, which today also includes the ballistic missiles on submarines and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Prime Minister M. Rocard, in a letter to the mayor of the small city of Apt in the southern part of the country where the missile base is located, declared that a final decision on this issue will be made in the fall of this year.

The opponents of eliminating the base on the Albion plateau are insisting on a continuation of research work on the so-called "redeployable" S-4 missile project, which could replace the S-3. Even though their reasoning has been subject to doubts even by experts in the French Ministry of Defense, this is hardly grounds to hope that they will be cut back or, at least, frozen at the current level in the event of structural changes in the French strategic forces. On the contrary, as follows from the statements of the French minister of defense, J.-P. Chevènement, the number of warheads at the country's disposal and their aggregate power will increase significantly overall by the end of the century even with the elimination of one of the components of the nuclear forces.

At the same time as the functionally obsolete missiles in the launch silos that were developed back in the 1970s are possibly being removed from service, the chief efforts of France are proposed to be concentrated on improving the nuclear submarine fleet. This, in the expression of President F. Mitterand, "diamond crown of restraint" will be supplemented with six new underwater missile carriers, the first of which should enter service in 1994. About 130 billion francs have been allocated for the development program of this component of the strike forces through the year 2008. Another important constituent element of the French nuclear arsenal could obviously be the air-launched cruise missiles, with a launch range of up to 1,200 kilometers, that are being developed in conjunction with Great Britain.

The problem of the development of French tactical nuclear weapons is an exceedingly delicate one from a foreign-policy point of view. Even though the USSR and the

United States, after prolonged discussions, have expressed their fundamental readiness to discuss the problem of cutting back the missiles in this class, that was unable to have any effect on the decision of President F. Mitterand to produce and deploy the new Hades tactical missiles, with considerably greater range than today's Plutons—450-480 km versus 90-120. One of the main causes of confusion is the fact that these missiles are comparable in technical parameters and effectiveness to those being eliminated by the USSR and the United States. The reaction of Paris to the dissatisfaction displayed by public opinion in France and outside its borders has been manifested as yet only in the fact that the quantitative plans were reduced—the deployment of 20 launchers with 40 missiles is now being proposed, instead of 60 launchers and 120 missiles.

The sentiments prevalent in the military and political circles of France are creating the general impression that the new factors typifying the situation in Europe have added to, rather than subtracted from, the enthusiasm of the advocates of relying on a nuclear strategy. They consider this strategy, in the face of the impending substantial cutbacks in conventional arms in Europe, an important means of consolidating and, possibly, strengthening the role of France in world affairs, not only European affairs. "We will not economize on nuclear restraint," affirmed Defense Minister J.-P. Chevènement. The prestige of French policy today, in his opinion, depends to a greater extent on the country's military than on export volume or the permanent membership of France on the UN Security Council.

Paris is taking into account, at the same time, the fact that France cannot remain outside the overall disarmament process without detriment to its own prestige and the interests of security policy in Europe. Some French experts feel that if the USSR and the United States are able to agree on reducing strategic offensive arms, a very weighty argument will appear in favor of restraint and stabilization with regard to the efforts of France in the nuclear realm.

Bessmertnykh Previews Geneva Talks With Baker

Comments on Departure From Moscow

*LD0706153191 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT
7 Jun 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Excerpt] Moscow, June 7 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said today that his talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva later in the day will aim to work out the "tactics" of completing the bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Saying that some technical issues still remained outstanding, Bessmertnykh told TASS: "We agreed with the U.S. secretary of state to take a look at the situation at the talks and give corresponding instructions to experts in order to finish this very important work."

He was speaking in an interview in a Moscow airport before his departure for Geneva.

"If we are able to complete work on the treaty within the next few weeks, this will naturally open a very serious possibility for our leaders to meet again, sign the treaty and take Soviet-U.S. relations to a still higher level," Bessmertnykh said.

"If we agree with the secretary of state to really concentrate now on this work, we shall have to work day and night for four weeks to wrap up the document," he added. [passage omitted]

Notes 'Technical' Questions

LD0706162591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1355 GMT 7 Jun 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 7 June (TASS)—In Geneva we want to concentrate on working out, so to speak, the "tactics" of completing work on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We have a few technical problems left which have not yet been agreed, and the U.S. secretary of state and I have agreed to clear up the situation which is arising there and to give the appropriate recommendations to the experts for the completion of all this very important work, USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has stated. He gave an interview today to the TASS correspondent at the airport before his departure for Geneva where his next working meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will take place.

If we succeed in completing work on the treaty somewhere in the next few weeks, then, of course, a serious prospect will open up for our leaders to meet again, sign this treaty, and bring Soviet-U.S. relations to a new, more intensive level, enriched with new accords, the head of the USSR foreign policy department continued.

The specific character of the situation consists in the fact that the problems that will be discussed are "especially technical;" that is to say, to a certain extent, the ministers depend on the views of the experts, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh pointed out. "But both I, and of course, the secretary of state, 'are carried away' by these problems, and I assume that for some technical problems a political solution will have to be found," he said.

It is difficult to forecast whether there will be a breakthrough at these talks, the minister noted. "Honestly speaking, I do not expect this now, even though I hope that we will succeed in getting the talks moving from the present fairly lazy phase and in taking them to a more active stage of development," Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said.

"If the secretary of state and I agree to really concentrate now on this work, we will have to work day and night to complete work on the document in the course of some four weeks," he continued. This is a huge document, which has on the whole been agreed—700 pages. Apart from the

solution of four or five technical tasks, the work connected with the treaty itself—comparing texts, further legal work on some wordings—will have to be finished off, he stressed. So that a very important task, connected with the prospect of the further development of Soviet-U.S. relations and of international strategic stability altogether, is facing us now. "That is why I am traveling to Geneva with the hope that we will succeed in getting these talks moving," the Soviet minister noted. [passage omitted]

Reports on Bessmertnykh-Baker Talks in Geneva

Proposals Exchanged on Outstanding Issues

LD0706210491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2005 GMT 7 Jun 91

[Report by correspondent Sergey Sedov]

[Excerpt] Geneva, 7 June (TASS)—Talks between USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker took place here today. The main focus of the talks was completion of work on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which, in the opinion of the sides, has become a priority now that all the issues connected with the treaty on conventional forces in Europe have been settled.

Constructive proposals were made by the Soviet side on finding mutually acceptable ways of resolving the most significant problems of the START treaty.

On his part, the U.S. secretary of state handed A. Bessmertnykh a letter from George Bush addressed to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, which contains some new ideas on the issues which are to be resolved in the sphere of strategic and offensive weapons reduction.

The two ministers singled out two or three main issues on which special attention will have to be focused. An agreement was also reached to reinforce the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the START talks in Geneva, particularly with technical experts in the field of telemetric information. The work of the delegations, as A. Bessmertnykh and J. Baker emphasized at a briefing, will from now on proceed under their closest daily supervision. It was stressed at this point that both sides are proceeding from a need for completion of work on the START treaty as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

Soviet Delegates Said 'Optimistic'

LD0706193591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Jun 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin: "Baker-Bessmertnykh: The Next Round"]

[Text] Less than a week has passed since the last meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in Lisbon, and again Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and James Baker are sitting down at the negotiating table. This time it is in Geneva.

The meeting is scheduled for the afternoon (it is aimed to begin at 1800 Geneva time) at the Soviet mission. Bessmertnykh has to fly to Switzerland from Moscow and Baker from Copenhagen, where he participated in a two-day conference of NATO countries foreign ministers.

The main theme on the agenda is the preparation for the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons. After it proved possible in Lisbon to eliminate differences of opinion on conventional arms, agreement on strategic offensive weapons is the only remaining question that must be settled before the beginning of the Soviet-American summit. As Bessmertnykh stated after Lisbon, "we and the Americans have to agree only on a few technical details." The last obstacles on the path to signing the treaty may be eliminated in Geneva. In any case, the members of the Soviet delegation with whom I talked just before they flew to Switzerland were in an optimistic frame of mind.

They spoke with less certainty about the date of the upcoming meeting between Bush and Gorbachev. Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Administration, confirmed that this question will be discussed in Geneva. He conceded, however, that the date of the summit could be officially announced later. As President Bush stated Thursday, the date of his visit to Moscow "will depend to a great extent on the results of the Geneva talks between the minister and the secretary of state."

Meeting Said 'Exceptionally Useful'

*LD0806162591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1430 GMT 8 Jun 91*

[Report by station correspondent Farid Seyful-Mulyukov from Geneva on 7 June meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State Baker]

[Text] The meeting yesterday evening at the Soviet mission in Geneva between USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and the U.S. secretary of state was short but exceptionally useful. This was stated at a news conference by the head of the U.S. State Department.

Here is a report from Geneva by our correspondent Farid Seyful-Mulyukov.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Today, a week after the Lisbon talks where the differences over conventional arms in Europe were settled, there has been a fresh round of Soviet-U.S. diplomatic talks. This shows, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh told correspondents, how seriously both sides are striving to resolve problems, especially in the reduction of weapons arsenals.

Particular attention during the Geneva meeting was paid to completing the elaboration of a Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive armaments. Its conclusion at the coming meeting of the USSR and U.S. presidents would make it possible to lower considerably the level of nuclear confrontation between the superpowers and to ensure

global security. This is why resolving the remaining problems and getting the treaty ready for signing is our highest priority task now, the USSR foreign minister stressed at a news conference in Geneva. He told correspondents that James Baker had handed over a letter from President Bush for Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, which contains some new ideas regarding the completion of work on the treaty on strategic armaments. We shall endeavor to give a speedy reply to these proposals, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh noted.

During the Geneva meeting, the Soviet side also put forward new thoughts on how to make progress at the negotiations. The end goal has been defined, the U.S. secretary of state stated at the news conference. George Bush, showing great determination, he said, is making efforts to remove the differences over a treaty on strategic offensive armaments so that the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union might hold their summit meeting and sign this important document. The specific date for this meeting, James Baker noted, was not discussed in Geneva.

The talks between the two ministers also considered some regional problems, above all matters connected with organizing a Near East peace conference. We consider, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh added, that joint efforts in this matter may lead to positive results.

The USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state discussed matters relating to bilateral relations, including economics, now becoming of ever greater importance.

The Geneva meeting in the view of those witnessing it was a continuation of the constructive interaction between Moscow and Washington on the fundamental problems of the present-day international situation.

Yazov Reported 'Optimistic' on Agreement 'Next Month'

*LD1006193191 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network
in Swedish 1600 GMT 10 Jun 91*

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Just a few days after President Gorbachev's lightning visit to Stockholm, it is time for a new Soviet visit at the top level. This time it is Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov, who today had talks with his Swedish colleague, Roine Carlsson.

[Correspondent Boerje Remdahl] [passage omitted] The Soviet defense minister was also very optimistic about the results of the START negotiations with the United States on long-range nuclear missiles. An agreement to cut strategic nuclear weapons arsenals by 50 percent will be ready next month, Marshal Yazov explained. In his speech he underscored that the Soviet military doctrine is now exclusively defensive. The Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions toward any other state and it will never begin a war, Marshal Yazov said. He expressed his hope for a new system of cooperation and joint security in Europe.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S. On-Site Inspection Chief Interviewed

PM0506091791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Major General Robert Parker, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, by V. Pogrebenkov in Moscow; date of interview not stated; first paragraph is introduction: "Trust Is Based on Verification"]

[Text] On 1 June it will be three years since the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles came into force. As is known, the last of these was eliminated on 12 May 1991. How is the disarmament process progressing? On what foundations does trust between the American and Soviet militaries rest? Major General Robert Parker, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, who is in Moscow at the moment, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Pogrebenkov] As a professional military man, where do you see the significance of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles?

[Parker] The treaty does not have a time limit, but it is intended that it be fulfilled in 13 years. Today we can only speak of the significance of its first phase. This consist of two parts. First of all, over three years, the USSR and the United States have eliminated all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (this totaled 2,692 units). Thus, nuclear missile weapons stopped being a "sacred cow" at least partially. Second, and this is more important—thanks to on-site inspections, we have achieved mutual trust. And this is the most reliable form of verifying the observance of the accord.

[Pogrebenkov] How many inspectors were working on the American side?

[Parker] Our agency was created for the purpose of this treaty, so to speak. It included arms specialists, translators, and technical personnel. These are primarily military people. Around 400 people are working in the agency. Altogether we have carried out around 530 inspections at 117 installations on USSR territory.

[Pogrebenkov] Did American inspectors record any violations of the treaty on the part of the USSR?

[Parker] As far as I know, there were no serious violations although certain issues did arise. For example, about the SS-23 (OTR-23) missiles which the Soviet Union sold to certain East European countries...

[Pogrebenkov] But the USSR sold these missiles with conventional warheads and 16 launchers for them to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria back in 1985-1987, that is, a long time before the treaty was signed. The missiles became the property of those countries, and the Soviet Union has nothing to do with them any longer.

[Parker] These are Soviet-made missiles. They belong to the class of shorter-range missiles which must be destroyed according to the letter and spirit of the treaty. But there is another problem—conducting X-ray examinations of containers bearing SS-25 missiles with the help of a "Cargoscan" apparatus also raises objections from the Soviet side.

[Pogrebenkov] I think this is fully justified. After all, these missiles do not come under the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

[Parker] Yes, that is true. But they are manufactured at the same plant in Votkinsk where the SS-20's are being eliminated. We had to be sure that it was the SS-25 missiles leaving the plant in the launch cannister and not the SS-20's. Soviet and American experts have managed to work out mutually acceptable technical decisions which got rid of both sides' concerns.

[Pogrebenkov] Certain agencies, citing U.S. sources, have recently reported that SS-20 missiles have been discovered in Cuba. What do you think about this?

[Parker] Evidently this is a misunderstanding. It is due to the fact that a journalist might have interpreted facts incorrectly. We know that there is one SS-4 (R-12) Soviet intermediate-range missile in Cuba and it is not performance-capable—it is a museum piece which recalls the tragic days of the Caribbean crisis. I have no information about any SS-20 missiles in Cuba. As far as I know, both the White House and the U.S. State Department have also refuted this report by the U.S. press.

[Pogrebenkov] Will the experience of implementing the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles be useful in future disarmament agreements?

[Parker] The Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is unique in that it provided for the complete elimination of two types of nuclear missile weapons. As far as I know, future agreements on disarmament only propose the partial reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons. But whatever happens, the experience of implementing the treaty testifies to the fact that the USSR and the United States are fully capable of cooperating when aiming for mutual concessions in the sphere of disarmament for the sake of achieving greater security. And of course, I would note the experience of carrying out on-site inspections. This verification, rigorous in form but quite reliable in practice, enables us to remove mutual suspicions. Without such verification, the implementation of subsequent agreements in the sphere of disarmament would not be very effective. But I am looking toward the future with optimism.

Last SS-20 Missile Destroyed in Rovno Oblast

LD0506055891 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 2106 GMT 4 Jun 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] In keeping with the Soviet-American treaty, the last SS-20 missile in the USSR has been destroyed. A report from Rovno Oblast.

[Correspondent L. Ilchenko] Three years ago saw the start of the dismantling of launch pads and means of transportation for the delivery and loading of SS-20 missiles, but this time it is an event of special importance: the 509th and last missile installation of this class is being destroyed. By invitation of the military, representatives of the public, journalists from various publications, radio, and tv, and foreign guests have come to the base. Among them are high-ranking Soviet and American military men. The liquidation was observed by an inspection group from the United States led by Major General Robert Parker. And now the operation is completed. The last SS-20 missile installation has been destroyed.

[Begin Major General V.I. Medvedev recording] This is the finale of a three-year period of fulfillment for the treaty on medium-range missiles. In practice the treaty will operate indefinitely. For 13 years there will be inspections. [end recording]

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

NATO Cuts Termed Due to Gorbachev Policy
PM0406133591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 May 91 Second Edition p 4

[V. Peresada report: "Flags in Rotterdam. NATO's Own Perestroika"]

[Text] Rotterdam, 28 May—As I approached "De Doelen," the largest concert hall in Rotterdam, where the spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly was going on, I saw 22 flags instead of 16. And among them was our own Soviet flag.

The unexpected protocol gesture reflected the main feature of the present session. Although about two years ago parliamentarians from the Warsaw Pact member states established ties with the North Atlantic Assembly, in which the NATO countries' parliaments are represented, delegations from beyond the former "Iron Curtain" had been coming to such meetings as guests until now. Now, however, for the first time they came to the session as "associated delegates," that is, with the permanent right to attend and participate in its work.

What can be singled out in the debates at the session? First of all, the general recognition of the need to restructure, or as they say here, "rebalance" NATO in view of the positive changes in Europe and in East-West relations as a whole. Practically every speaker advocated shifting the emphasis from the military aspect of the alliance's activity to the political one. The session welcomed the elaboration of a new NATO strategy which is being conducted in this direction, including the intention to reduce armed forces and move them back from the "border with the East." At the same time, firm support was expressed for the NATO leadership's plan to ensure exceptionally high troop

mobility so that the "necessary defense capability in the alliance's zone of responsibility" can be maintained with a smaller numerical strength.

A great deal of attention was paid to the future European security system. Proceeding on the basis of the idea that this system is unthinkable without the East European countries and the Soviet Union, the participants in the meeting believe, however, that NATO should be the main prop for security on the continent. This was most clearly manifest in the speeches by the U.S., British, and Netherlands representatives. What kind of a role can be assigned to the CSCE process, which, as was said here, "cannot be an alternative to NATO"? I gained the impression that at the moment it is still seen mainly not as a mechanism for cooperation, but as a kind of communications channel with the East, particularly the USSR.

The lessons of the Persian Gulf war served as an incentive for the session to elaborate a document which, in my view, is of great and practical international significance. This is the draft resolution on the nonproliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as state-of-the-art military technologies in the Near East. It contains a proposal to convene an international conference on this question in which the United States, Britain, France, the USSR, and other interested countries would participate. The Soviet parliamentary delegation expressed a positive attitude toward the North Atlantic Assembly's initiative.

I asked delegation head V.G. Kucherenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission, to share his impressions of the session's work:

"Since we have been active participants in the session instead of passive onlookers and we have spoken in all its commissions during the debates, we have formed many impressions. Without exaggeration, the main thing is the West's universal concern about the state of affairs in our country and the clearly expressed interest in ensuring that the situation in the USSR stabilizes as quickly as possible. Many reports contained not only an analysis of the situation, but also attempts to suggest some kind of solutions and, in general, support for the reforms being carried out in our country and the hope that they will lead the USSR out of the crisis and preserve it as a renewed state.

"At the same time, the instability in our country is being used as one of the main reasons for keeping and even developing NATO, which is being praised as the virtual future guarantee of European security. A definite division of the former East into East European countries and the Soviet Union can be traced."

And here is the opinion of a military man. Our interlocutor is Army General V.N. Lobov, a member of the delegation:

"I have participated in a number of previous assembly sessions and, comparing them, I would like to say: Whereas before the USSR was constantly reproached for various things, now there was no criticism; instead there

was concern and a desire to help us, partly, of course, in the interests of their own security.

"Another new aspect is the redistribution of NATO efforts, including in the military sphere. Here a great deal is still unclear and, though there are positive trends, there are also others which require cautious approaches and assessments on our part. But what I would like to note is this. It is sometimes said in our country that we are disarming unilaterally and there is no reaction from NATO. This meeting showed once again that such opinions are erroneous. There was talk of reductions in armed forces, and, what is more, substantial ones, reductions in military budgets, and the general perestroika of NATO in the new conditions. In short, Gorbachev's policy is bearing tangible fruit."

Ladygin Interviewed on Moiseyev Trip to U.S.

*PM3105135191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 May 91 Union Edition p 3*

[Interview with Lieutenant General F. Ladygin, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate, by V. Litovkin; date and place of interview not stated; first two paragraphs are introduction: "How Our Generals' Visit to Washington Ended"]

[Text] A Soviet delegation headed by Army General M. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, was in Washington 20 through 22 May 1991. The delegation included USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. Kvitsinskiy and experts from the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, and other departments. The world press continues to devote close attention to the visit. That is understandable: The visit to the United States by the chief of general staff was designed to eliminate the keen contradictions which had arisen between the two countries over the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe.

How did the visit end—with success or failure? Our correspondent's questions are answered by a member of the Soviet delegation, Lieutenant General F. Ladygin, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Treaty and Legal Directorate.

[Ladygin] There can be no question of failure, Fedor Ivanovich said. I shall quote to you the words the U.S. President said to his journalists on the day after the meeting with Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff, which, incidentally, was not planned in advance and which took place at G. Bush's initiative. "It took place very well," the president said. "It advanced matters... I am pleased with the meeting." As you can understand, such assessments are not given of failure.

[Litovkin] But forgive me, epithets and assessments are not an argument. There should be some material proof of the visit's results.

[Ladygin] If we are speaking of "material" proof of success, then judge it for yourself. We succeeded in finally

settling the question of the arms in the three coastal defense divisions in the north of our country, the Baltic, and the Black Sea, that is in the region of the application of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, which were formed in the Navy in 1988 back when the Vienna talks mandate was still being drafted. It is a case of 813 tanks, 972 armored combat vehicles, and 846 artillery systems which are at these divisions' disposal. That is the quantity of arms which we shall additionally reduce within the deadline stipulated by the treaty.

[Litovkin] That is we have made very large concessions?

[Ladygin] Yes, these are concessions by us, but outside the framework of the treaty. Although our interests were nevertheless considered. The U.S. side agreed that the armored personnel carriers guarding the positions of the strategic missile troops, there are incidentally 1,701 of them, are not included in the overall ceilings for conventional forces limitation.

The most sensitive question was that of the arms of the naval infantry, traditionally a component of the Navy. According to the mandates of the talks, on which our partners and primarily the United States particularly insisted, these forces were excluded from the subject matter of the talks.

In Washington we suggested "freezing" the 120 tanks, 753 armored combat vehicles, and 234 artillery systems in the four naval infantry brigades of the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets without including them in the limitation ceilings. Incidentally, we suggested that similar decisions could also extend to other states signing the treaty which also have such forces.

But this proposal was not adopted.

During the quite complex talks we set about "compensating" for these quantities of arms with the equipment which under the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe should have been deployed at depots. That is we expressed the readiness to reduce this quantity of equipment at the depots and then in total our arms in the ground forces, coastal defense, and naval infantry would not exceed the overall levels.

That ensured a breakthrough during the chief of general staff's visit to Washington and the success of the talks as a whole. An obvious rapprochement of viewpoints emerged. But one more question remained unagreed—the number of arms in the regular troops.

[Litovkin] You are speaking of the tanks moved across the Urals?

[Ladygin] No, it is a case of those arms which are in the European part of the USSR. The question of these arms will be agreed in the very near future, as we agreed in Washington.

As for the tanks and other equipment which we moved across the Urals before signing the treaty, that question

was also discussed. It may be said that our partners' concern has been eliminated. I think this problem no longer exists.

[Litovkin] Let's sum up the results. Can we say that during the visit to Washington by the chief of general staff the military have, by their concessions, created conditions for a summit meeting?

[Ladygin] The question of a summit meeting was indeed raised by the U.S. Administration depending on whether or not the problems concerning the treaty on conventional armed forces are settled. And in this connection I would not speak of concessions. Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff, was fulfilling the personal instructions of the USSR president. You should understand one simple thing: It was not so much a question of tanks—although that too is important—as of the two great powers' trust in each other, which has strengthened in recent years, and of the entire complex of Soviet-U.S. relations and ultimately of the fate of perestroika. And here you cannot manage without compromises.

Soviet-German Troop Withdrawal Commission Meets
PM0306194491 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Colonel V. Markushin: "Commission Session"]

[Text] As the Western Group of Forces press center has reported, the latest session of the Soviet-German commission formed on the basis of Article 25 of the Treaty on the Presence of Soviet Troops on FRG Territory and Their Systematic Withdrawal has been held in Berlin. In accordance with the alternating system, Ambassador V. Bertele chaired the session. The Soviet delegation was headed by Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces.

The German side was briefed on the progress in the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the first five months of this year. The commission noted that the withdrawal is proceeding in accordance with the schedule agreed between the two sides. In all, over this period some 50,000 men have been withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces (30 percent of the plan for 1991), as well as some 12,500 items of various kinds of equipment and armaments. More than 260,000 tonnes of material and technical resources have also been withdrawn.

The commission examined problems relating to the hand-over to the Soviet side of deserters who are now in the FRG, and also to the safety of Soviet servicemen and members of their families.

Comment on Outcome of Baker-Bessmertnykh Talks
LD0406153891 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2300 GMT 3 Jun 91

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] Moscow and Washington have spoken highly of the agreement reached by the Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and the American secretary of state, James Baker, in Lisbon to resolve the differences on a treaty for conventional arms in Europe. Here's a commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov. He writes the following:

The hard problem was settled at last. By both countries' efforts with diplomats, military officials, and presidents themselves taking part, a mutually acceptable solution was worked out and it looks like a treaty on conventional arms in Europe will be ratified and come into force very soon. Signed in Paris back in November of last year by 22 states, the treaty provides for scrapping more than 100,000 pieces of arms including tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery guns deployed across Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

What's significant is that by this treaty the Soviet Union will reduce by seven times the arms it has compared with that of NATO. Although the differences between the USSR and the United States concern mainly three Soviet divisions or about 1 percent of the reducible weapons, nonetheless they were a real stumbling block through several months. Washington linked solution to this problem with nearly all aspects of bilateral ties including progress at START negotiations, preparation for a summit, and even economic cooperation. Observers were guessing whether the USSR president was influenced by opponents to the rapprochement with America and whether the U.S. president got cooler to better ties with the Soviet Union. This is why the accords reached in Lisbon are so important. They reiterate the mutual desire and determination of Moscow and Washington to work together in order to achieve more trust and interaction. As President Bush remarked at West Point: This is good for world peace and for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Indeed, it's as if a huge stone has been removed from the road to reopen it to traffic. Judging by official statements, the delegations in Geneva have been instructed to speed up work to complete a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms so this could be signed at the upcoming summit in Moscow. Simultaneously, forecasts are being made that this meeting can take place at the end of June or early July.

There have also been encouraging reports from Washington about steps toward closer trade and economic ties. Apparently there is now a situation where the Soviet Union and the United States can understand each other's interests better and show more good will than ever before. That's the basis for this unique opportunity of finding mutually acceptable solutions to complex problems. Perhaps this process should be accelerated to make up for the lost time over the differences concerning the conventional arms accord.

Bessmertnykh on Progress Toward CFE Accord

LD0406093691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0530 GMT 4 Jun 91

[Excerpts] Today in Moscow, Soviet and American experts will begin discussing the technical problems related to the accord on limitations on conventional arms in Europe [CFE]. Our diplomatic correspondent, Viktor Levin, will explain why the experts are meeting:

[Begin recording] [Levin] It is a question of the final, technical formulation of the accords reached during the talks between USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State Baker in Lisbon. [passage omitted]

As Bessmertnykh returned from Lisbon, on the aircraft he spoke to a group of Soviet journalists who were accompanying him. He spoke about the trip as a whole. Naturally, a considerable part of the conversation was devoted to the accord on the problems of conventional weapons. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich said:

[Bessmertnykh] All the problems occurred owing to the fact that we did not have the same interpretation in regard to Article Three of the agreement on land-based armaments in the area covered by the treaty. We could have taken two paths. The first path was a juridical and law-based one. The second path was that of making some specific decisions there, on the spot. We spent a long time weighing both variants. The legal discussion would have had us deeply bogged down without prospects of getting out of the situation and out of the deadlock. Therefore, we decided to find options for a way out of the state of affairs which would satisfy the requirements of the agreement, would ensure our interests, and would be sufficiently trustworthy both for the West not to be concerned about us, and for us to have no worries regarding the West. That is why, jointly with our Defense Ministry and the General Staff, we studied all kinds of variants.

Recently, as you remember, General Moiseyev, chief of our General Staff, made a trip to Washington. He set off with the position that had already been considered and that contained elements linked to finding specific formulas for the distribution of armaments which will eliminate this problem. He did a lot to get rid of an obstacle that threatened to block the way. It was necessary to find certain additional solutions that will remove it completely. It was via the mathematics of the movement of weapons—we are talking here about tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery—that we managed to set up a system that allows preservation in full of all levels of the agreement—the general level, (quantitative) levels, and the level of regular combat units. Such is the solution. Of course, several technical problems have emerged linked to ensuring that the measures that are being taken are convincing. I think that next week we will be able to resolve all this in a couple of days.

[Levin] I must remind you that this conversation took place on Saturday, so it should be noted that next week means this week. A path has opened toward completion of

the treaty on strategic offensive weapons and for the next meeting between the U.S. and USSR presidents. [end recording]

Vienna CSBM Talks Previewed

OW0606054091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1800 GMT 5 Jun 91

[From "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—"Vienna Talks on Confidence Building Measures in Europe: USSR May Face Isolation Unless It Assumes a More Realistic Position" (by Mikhail Mayorov, diplomatic correspondent)]

[Text] An atmosphere of hope has now emerged in the run-up to the 11th session by 34-nation talks in Vienna on confidence building and security [CSBM] in Europe. Sources close to the negotiations told DP [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent that there might be a breakthrough in the deadlocked talks now that the superpowers sorted out differences on the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreement.

Disarmament issues are not on the agenda of talks on confidence building measures, but their linkage is making itself increasingly felt. Last week's agreement in Lisbon between Mr. Bessmertnykh and Mr. Baker was highly important for breaking the deadlock. The sources mentioned told DP correspondent that the 34-nation talks had a chance of reaching understanding on the whole spectrum of issues related to the prevention of possible military conflicts in Europe.

It was made clear that the optimism by the Soviet negotiators could have been greater but for a change in the situation at the talks. Earlier, the negotiators formed three groups—Warsaw Pact, NATO, and non-aligned countries. With Warsaw Pact's military structures now overhauled, the Soviet Union faces the danger of being isolated unless it assumes a more realistic position.

On May 2, the Soviet delegation submitted a paper, so far unofficial, dealing with restrictions on military activity by land troops and airforces. On the whole, the document is thrust at eliminating the remnants of military confrontation in Europe. Moscow proposes to curtail the scope of military activity by bringing to a minimum the number of military exercises which can be damaging not only to regional security, but also to environment. It is also envisaged to spread similar restrictions on naval activities but the Soviet Union's partners in the talks have so far shown no sign of interest.

The negotiators are due to meet for a 10 day seminar in Vienna on October 8 to discuss military doctrines. However, special expectations are being laid on a meeting in mid-June by the foreign ministers of 34 nations. This may lead to disarmament and confidence building talks to merge again into one set of negotiations as Soviet negotiators are increasingly inclined to prefer. DP correspondent was told that one mandate can help find solutions to issues still unresolved both by the 22-nation and 34-nation talks.

NATO Foreign Ministers Note U.S.-Soviet Accord on CFE

'Satisfaction' Over Lisbon Talks

*LD0606142391 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT
6 Jun 91*

[Text] Copenhagen, June 6 (TASS)—A session of the NATO Council at foreign minister level today passed a joint statement in connection with an agreement reached by the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers in Lisbon, settling disputable issues on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The session opened here today.

The NATO foreign ministers express satisfaction with the results reached in the Portuguese capital, which inspires hope for rapid ratification of the CFE treaty, signed in Paris in November 1990. The treaty is a cornerstone for a future European security system, the statement reads.

The foreign ministers hope that during the current round of the Vienna talks, the sides will reach progress in reducing the armed forces of NATO and the Soviet Union in Europe and the basic provisions of the Open Skies regime agreement will be signed sooner, the statement reads.

'Equal Guarantees' Urged

*LD0606222691 Moscow TASS in English 2200 GMT
6 Jun 91*

[Text] Copenhagen, June 7 (TASS)—A session of the NATO Council at foreign minister level opened in Copenhagen on Thursday.

Participants adopted a joint statement saying that guarantees of NATO countries' security can be achieved if member countries of the former Warsaw Treaty and the Soviet Union have equal guarantees.

NATO does not aim to use the changes in Europe to gain some advantages or threaten the interests of some European countries, the statement says.

The document stresses that NATO will continue develop cooperation with countries of eastern and central Europe and the Soviet Union. However, this does not mean that these countries can join NATO.

NATO foreign ministers propose a number of initiatives aimed to deepen cooperation with the Soviet Union and member countries of the former Warsaw Treaty organisation, and promote stability and peace on the continent.

These initiatives include the expansion of diplomatic ties between NATO and other European countries, including the USSR, the intensification of military contacts between the military leadership of NATO and countries in central and eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

The foreign ministers also propose to invite high ranking military officials from these countries to visit NATO military educational establishments to share experience.

Military experts could attend NATO military exercises and familiarise themselves with its scientific programmes and exchange opinions on various issues.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Gorbachev Lays Groundwork for Semipalatinsk Tests

*LD0506100391 Moscow All-Union Radio First
Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0700 GMT
5 Jun 91*

[Text] USSR President Gorbachev will address the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic with an official proposal to carry out two nuclear explosions as a physics experiment at the Semipalatinsk testing ground in December. The force of one of the explosions will not exceed 20 kilotons and the force of the other will not exceed one kiloton, Nurtazin, chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources, said to a POSTFAKTUM correspondent. According to him, the draft decree by the USSR president envisages complete closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground and its conversion into a scientific-research and scientific-production center under Union-republican subordination. Payment of compensation to the population of this region of Kazakhstan totaling 3.5 billion rubles [R] over a period of 4 to 5 years, and R1 billion for capital construction, will also be submitted to the republican parliament.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Central European NFZ Proposal Revived

*AU0406115091 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 3 Jun 91 p 8*

[Article by Batenin: "A Chance for a Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] With the Warsaw Pact disbanding itself, a unique chance has been created in Europe to implement the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone [NFZ] in the center of the continent.

The "Palme Commission" was the first to develop such a plan in 1982, which envisioned creating a corridor free of theater nuclear weapons about 150 kilometers wide on either side of the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The Plan of the Corridor Was Unacceptable to NATO

At the time, the East and West reacted differently to the initiative. It was unacceptable to NATO because it ran counter to the "strategy of flexible response," which was based on the means of defense from forward-based positions including nuclear weapons. The USSR, holding the nuclear weapons potential within the Warsaw Pact, basically backed the initiative but wanted the corridor to be

expanded to 250-300 kilometers. The initiative failed at the time because the confrontation between the blocs was too great.

The present political situation is an entirely different one. The CSCE process has proved its effectiveness. There is an agreement between 22 countries on the reduction of conventional weapons and forces; security and confidence-building measures have been developed, and the USSR's and NATO's military strategies have changed. A broad strip of nonaligned countries has appeared on the military map. The USSR's military presence is disappearing quickly. Soon, not a single Soviet soldier will be deployed outside the USSR's western border. In addition, the Warsaw Pact's nuclear weapons structure on the territories of Hungary, Poland, the CSFR, and in the five eastern laender of the FRG will cease to exist.

In this way a strange "military-strategic vacuum" is emerging in the center of Europe before our eyes. What type of security structures will fill this vacuum? This is a problem which should interest all of Europe, which is going through transition from cold war to new forms of security in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Alliance in the System of Collective Security

The Soviet Union is closely watching the possibility of the Eastern European countries orienting themselves toward NATO. In view of the strategy of the NATO bloc, which continues to be marked by a Western European ego-centrism enhanced by the U.S. military presence, the USSR should consider such a development as an increased military danger to itself.

On the other hand, however, the new global threats to peace (such as the Persian Gulf) require the creation of an effective, highly organized, quick reaction military instrument within a collective security system. It would not be wise in Europe to give up NATO as a basis for such an instrument. However, at least three conditions should be met:

- NATO's structural integration into the CSCE process with the goal of a geostrategic transformation of the bloc, and the inclusion of the USSR and the Eastern European countries in its political and military organs.
- The practical change of NATO's concept and its opening to the East with the goal of giving all European countries from the Atlantic to the Urals equal security guarantees.
- The abolition of military doctrines and strategies that proceed from the military-political split of the continent and are marked by the spirit of cold war.

It should be noted that the fulfillment of these conditions (in particular the third one) requires NATO to carry out a number of changes (structure, quantity, deployment, military technology). Essentially, it would be a new military organization that would be based on the existing infrastructure.

Proposal for a Transition Period

Building a "pan-European" defense and security system within the scope of the CSCE will take much time. The transition period will be accompanied by instability in Eastern Europe, and the old NATO including its traditional strategies will continue to exist for some time. It would therefore be extremely important that the new Eastern European buffer zone not be affected. I am talking in particular about Hungary, the CSFR, and Poland.

The national military forces of these countries as such cannot represent a real danger to NATO or the USSR. However, there remains the problem of possible nuclear weapons. Stability during the transition period could be guaranteed best if NATO and the USSR were able to agree that the mentioned region should be considered a nuclear-free zone—even though such a procedure would not be entirely in line with the international practice regarding the setting up of nuclear free zones. As a rule, the countries concerned declare themselves "nuclear free," and the nuclear powers give their approval in the form of "negative guarantees."

We can consider the signing of the treaty on the definite Two plus Four arrangement on Germany a precedent. Two articles of the treaty (Article 3. 1. and Article 5. 3.) contain formulations on the basis of which the territory of the former GDR can be considered a nuclear-free zone. The status of this zone is guaranteed by the fact that all the powers that have nuclear weapons in Europe have signed the treaty. In addition, the sovereign Germany has assumed the following obligations: It renounces the production, possession, and control of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and it cannot admit nuclear weapons or delivery means for nuclear weapons on the territory of the former GDR.

Problems of Balance in Europe Can Be Solved

The Eastern European countries' orientation toward the West confronts these states with the question as to where their place should be in the network of the military-political forces on the continent. It is quite possible that their place will be on the side of NATO. However, in the transition period such a development would be apt to affect the strategic balance created in Europe between the USSR and NATO. Fixing a nuclear-free zone on the basis of international law—a zone that is basically created by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Poland, the CSFR, Hungary, and eastern Germany—could be an important stabilizing factor. Such a nuclear-free "buffer" is necessary for Europe. History has given us a chance.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Moscow Forum on Asia-Pacific Issues Ends

*LD2405033491 Moscow TASS in English 1140 GMT
23 May 91*

[By diplomatic correspondent Vasilii Titov]

[Text] Moscow, May 23 (TASS)—The development of the dialogue and a search for new forms of cooperation in the economy, policy and the humanitarian sphere is the only way to turn the Asia-Pacific region into a zone of peace and good neighbourly relations between nations.

This conclusion was drawn by the international scientific conference "Problems of Peace and Security in the North-eastern Asia-Pacific Region: Glance Into the 21st Century." The conference ended today after a three-day discussion.

The meeting debated how to lower the level of military confrontation in the region, to step up integration processes and to expand humanitarian exchanges.

Scientists and economists from the United States, South Korea, China, Mongolia and the Soviet Union concurred in the opinion that their dialogue was important to draft measures to strengthen confidence and overcome political and economic divisions in this important area.

Under the conference programme, the forum established the international fund for cooperation between Asia-Pacific countries. Moscow University Rector Anatoliy Logunov was elected fund chairman.

Conference participants were today received at the Soviet parliament committee for international relations.

Analyst Views Asia-Pacific Detente Prospects

*LD0106092691 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1200 GMT 30 May 91*

[Commentary "on the prospects for a military detente in Asia and the Pacific," by military affairs observer Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Kozlov, in Russian with English voiceover]

[Text] So far only two countries in the region—the Soviet Union and China—have taken major disarmament steps in the region, says our observer. They have reduced their armed forces and have started talks on demilitarizing their common border.

As for this country, in keeping with the INF treaty, all medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles have been destroyed in its Asian part. Besides that, for more than three years running there has been no increase in the number of the Soviet nuclear weapons there. As promised, the group of troops in the east of this country has been reduced by 200,000 men; 16 warships are being withdrawn from the Soviet Pacific Fleet; and finally, this year the pullout of the Soviet troops from Mongolia will be completed ahead of schedule.

It is felt in Moscow that the cause of the military detente in the Asian and Pacific region would be greatly enhanced by a dialogue of the major military powers—the USSR, the United States, Japan, China, and India.

During his recent visit to Tokyo, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev advanced such a proposal without any strings attached. If our partners are willing we are ready to discuss any concrete initiatives.

As disarmament talks have brought about such favorable changes in international relations in Europe, there's no reason to reject them in Asia. Unfortunately Washington is yet to respond to the Soviet proposals. So far it shows practically no reaction.

An ASSOCIATED PRESS report has been noticed in this country to the effect that by next year a total number of 14,000 American soldiers will be withdrawn from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. However, this move cannot be regarded as significant. Even less so because of reports that the United States Defense Department does not plan any dramatic cuts in its forces in the Asian and Pacific region.

In short, Washington is responding rather cautiously to the appreciable warming in the international climate in the region. Whatever the case, the prospects for a military detente in Asia and the Pacific are far from dark, unlike what many people still believe at least due to the fact that without easing the military tensions it is difficult to picture a successful advancement in that region to prosperity [sentence as heard]. Understandably no big military power can stay on the sidelines.

FRANCE

President Mitterrand Announces Disarmament Plan
LD0606081091 Paris LE FIGARO in French
 4 Jun 91 p 6

[Unattributed report: "The French Disarmament Plan"]

[Text] The following are the main excerpts from the arms control and disarmament plan announced today by the president of the Republic to mark the opening of the 37th session of the Western European Union [WEU] assembly.

"The growing number of increasingly costly and destructive weapon systems is presenting a growing threat to the world.... The whole world, the south and the north, has a vital interest in this race being halted...."

I.—Objectives by Category

"Each arms category calls for specific treatment, if necessary in stages...."

—Banning and Elimination of Chemical Weapons:

"The whole international community meeting in Paris in January 1989 recognized the need to complete the convention on a ban as quickly as possible. France proposed to convene the Special Committee on Chemical Weapons in Geneva at the ministerial level to complete the negotiations before the end of the year."

—Banning of Bacteriological Weapons:

"During next September's conference to examine the 1972 treaty on a general ban, France will propose adding a protocol relating to verification."

—Nuclear Disarmament:

"It remains an essential objective. France supports the two superpowers' efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals. At the same time, it is important to prevent nuclear proliferation from outside the five existing nuclear powers."

"France, which already implements all the Nonproliferation Treaty's provisions, has decided to sign the treaty...."

—The System of Monitoring Ballistic Technologies:

"It enables those who now have the know-how to limit the risks of ballistic proliferation and should only be a step toward a more general agreement...."

—Conventional Armaments:

"Conventional arms exports must not conflict with the search...for a balance of forces at the lowest possible level respecting each state's right to security."

II.—Regional Objectives

"The Europeans have moved from the Cold War to peaceful coexistence, and then to cooperation in the CSCE framework.... They have signed the first conventional

disarmament agreements.... This approach could inspire other initiatives in other regions.

"We are calling for regional security arrangements based on the following rules:

—Adoption by the interested parties of regional confidence-building and security measures:

"The first precondition for confidence is information. Measures to promote openness and confidence—in other words, mutual information on the capabilities and state of the forces and on the movement of armed forces—reduce the feeling of threat and prepare for the control of disarmament proper. A framework is needed for this, possibly a regional organization, as well as means of verification on the spot and by satellite."

—Balance of Regional Forces:

"Seeking to move closer to this by national decisions and negotiations. Arms export policies must not hamper this objective."

"Strict regional implementation of the category provisions laid down for atomic, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles."

III.—The UN Role

"The United Nations is now capable of fully playing the role entrusted to it by the charter. France thinks that it is therefore up to the Security Council to back and possibly harmonize these disarmament and nonproliferation policies...."

Nuclear Testing To Continue Despite NPT Adherence

AU0406124991 Paris AFP in English 1211 GMT
 4 Jun 91

[Text] Paris, June 4 (AFP)—France's decision announced Monday to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not mean France will put a stop to nuclear testing in the Pacific, Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said Tuesday.

Mr. Dumas, speaking to legislators from countries belonging to the Western European Union, said "non-proliferation is one thing, a country's defence policy is another."

He told the WEU meeting in Paris that the credibility of France's defence policy, based on a strategy of nuclear deterrence, "calls for its arsenal to be kept up to date, hence the need for tests."

Mr. Dumas said that when prospects for disarmament were deemed adequate, "France will take the appropriate measures.... In the meantime, France will not stop these tests which are indispensable for modernising its armament and maintaining it at a minimally effective level, that is at a level capable of meeting its defence requirements."

GERMANY

CDU Rejects Nuclear Modernization, Urges SNF Ban *LD3105100691 Hamburg DPA in German 0626 GMT 30 May 91*

[Text] Osnabrueck (DPA)—Karl Lamers, the foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] parliamentary groups, rejects the debate triggered by the NATO defense ministers in Brussels on the modernization of nuclear weapons at this time. In an interview with NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG (Thursday's edition), the CDU politician says, commenting on the final communique, that the first priority now should be giving up nuclear short-range missiles [SNF]. The United States and the Soviet Union should commit themselves to this.

In any case, an agreement should be strived for with the Soviet Union concerning the United States' nuclear systems, which will remain in Europe in the future, and it should not aim to only limit the systems of both sides but should mean mutual control.

Bush Mideast Arms Control Plan Lacks 'Right Priorities'

*AU3105131791 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
31 May 91 p 1*

[Fritz Wirth commentary: "Bush's Plan"]

[Text] For winners, too, the most important obligation and lesson of a war is to avoid its repetition. In this light, the disarmament initiative, which President Bush presented for the Middle East yesterday, is of a logical consistency. It is an honest and ambitious plan; however, the reality of this world makes one fear that it will also be a futile plan.

What makes this initiative so honorable is the following: More than 80 percent of the weapons in the Middle East come from the "big five" in the UN Security Council—the PRC, the USSR, the United States, France, and Great Britain. Bush has called on them to impose self-limitation. A few months ago these five countries showed remarkable solidarity in their outrage against Saddam Husayn. It must be doubted, however, that this loyalty also exists concerning the disarmament of the arms arsenals of this region. The intensity with which China, for instance, continues to supply the Middle East with missiles and nuclear material, causes concern.

This gives rise to the next question: How can one expect a country like Israel to lay down its weapons, as long as it is threatened by dictators all around who still refuse to officially end the state of war with Israel? As long as this situation continues, the United States is bound by its security guarantee to Israel.

These are the realities in the Middle East. There is no doubt that there are too many weapons in this powder keg. If they are removed and nothing else changes, one country—namely Israel—will be turned over to its enemies.

Therefore, George Bush's plan lacks, above all, the right priorities. It is necessary to change the political realities before the depressing military reality of this region can be changed with any prospects for success.

Government Supports French Disarmament Plan

*LD0306132891 Hamburg DPA in German 1310 GMT
3 Jun 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal Government supports the French disarmament plan. It corresponds to the fundamental position of the Federal Government and all its efforts to stop the spread of mass destruction weapons worldwide and to limit passing on conventional arms, Government Spokesman Dieter Vogel said to journalists in Bonn.

Vogel also welcomed the French willingness to sign the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The foreign policy spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union Bundestag group, Karl Lamers, demanded that as the last "official" nuclear power, China should now be requested to emulate the French step.

Genscher Wants Accelerated Bundeswehr Disarmament

*AU0706174391 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 5 Jun 91 p 4*

[Dietmar Seher report: "Genscher Wants To Present Ratification Law Before End of June"]

[Text] Bonn—The Bundeswehr must take the scrapping of its weapons seriously. According to information acquired by BERLINER ZEITUNG, Foreign Minister Genscher (Free Democratic Party of Germany) wants to present the ratification law for the Vienna disarmament agreement in the Bundestag before the end of June. Diplomatic circles confirmed in Bonn yesterday: "All preparations have been concluded."

The sudden speed has become possible because of the superpowers' agreement in Lisbon last weekend [1-2 June]. Washington and Moscow eliminated differences that arose because the Soviets assigned ground forces that were included in the agreement to naval forces that are not affected by the disarmament agreements.

Germany committed itself to large-scale disarmament in Vienna. The agreement prescribes the category of weapons that have to disappear from the arsenals, but not the special types. It is openly admitted in Defense Ministry circles, therefore, that in the old Bundeswehr above all older weapons systems, such as the "Alpha Jet" ground-attack bomber, are to be scrapped and small amounts of modern equipment—for example, the "Leopard-I" tank—are to be given to other NATO partners.

The disarmament process is to be managed by two expert groups: 100 Bundeswehr officers will deal with the military aspects and about 30 Foreign Ministry diplomats with the political aspects. The work is coordinated by a steering

committee. The two groups also have to ensure that foreign inspectors will be able to check unhindered whether Germany observes its contractual obligations.

BND: Soviet Chemical, Nuclear Arms Remain in East
AU0606141291 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
 6 Jun 91 p 2

[Ewald Koenig report: "Nuclear Weapons in Former GDR"]

[Text] Bonn/Berlin—Contrary to all assertions by Soviet military officials and an assurance by the Bonn Defense Ministry, the FRG Intelligence Service (BND) is convinced that Soviet chemical warfare agents and nuclear weapons are still stored in the former GDR. The Soviets are delaying their withdrawal because the removal poses technical problems for them, the BND claims.

As DIE PRESSE learned from the BND, German intelligence experts proceed from the assumption that the Soviet Union will cooperate with the United States in the withdrawal and scrapping of the weapons. The U.S. Armed Forces have already removed their chemical weapons from western Germany and transported them to an atoll where they will be scrapped. As recently as in April, Soviet military officials assured Defense Minister Stoltenberg that no nuclear or chemical weapons are stored on the territory of the former GDR. However, German intelligence circles believe that the extraordinarily tight control of some military facilities suggests the storage of explosive material there. Thus, it is no big surprise that nervous Soviet guards fired shots at Bundeswehr officers who wanted to explore Soviet depots—such as in Altengrabow, for example.

The BND has since asked the Bonn Government to inform the governments in the former GDR about the nuclear weapons depots. According to the BND, the laender governments do not know anything about such weapons.

Reports on SS-23 Missiles in FRG Possession

Missiles Said Still 'in Working Order'

LD0906104391 Berlin ADN in German 0954 GMT
 9 Jun 91

[Excerpt] Bonn (ADN)—Medium-range missiles on German territory which are under the command of Defense Minister Stoltenberg are, according to a report in BILD AM SONNTAG, said to be still "in working order." The defense expert Ulrich Adam (Christian Democratic Union) from Greifswald confirmed to the newspaper that establishments of the former NVA [National People's Army] were recently viewed in the Potsdam/Brandenburg region, at which point it was ascertained "that the whole stock of SS-23 medium-range missiles is standing there, still in working order." Taken aback, the Defense Ministry is now considering how to destroy them, the Sunday paper reports.

The Free Democratic Party is calling for speedy action by Stoltenberg so that, following the destruction of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles called for under the INF treaty, the Federal Republic "is no longer the only country that has medium-range missiles in Central Europe." [passage omitted]

Ministry Denies Report

LD0906141791 Berlin ADN in German 1357 GMT
 9 Jun 91

[Excerpt] Bonn/Hamburg (ADN)—The Defense Ministry on Sunday denied a newspaper report that the Bundeswehr possesses SS-23 medium-range missiles from former National People's Army stocks.

Spokesman Karlheinz Reichert said it is correct—and the ministry has known it for a long time—"that the Bundeswehr owns 24 SS-23 missiles without launchers and without nuclear warheads." Their destruction is being prepared. The timing is dependent on the completion of current development work on an environment-friendly destruction process, but will definitely be before 1994. Of the original four mobile launchers, three have been destroyed and one given to a museum, the spokesman said. [passage omitted]

NORWAY

Defense Minister Accuses USSR of CFE Violations

91P20364A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
 24 May 91 p 8

[Olav Trygve Storvik article: "Vigorous Arms Buildup on the Kola Peninsula"]

[Excerpts] Moscow's views on the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] disarmament treaty are contrary to the agreement, says Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst. The Soviets are now carrying out a significant force buildup on the Kola Peninsula under cover of the disarmament treaty.

Holst cannot support sending the agreement to the Storting for approval unless Moscow changes its attitude.

"The efforts to get Moscow to comply with the decisions contained in the disarmament treaty have top priority in Norwegian security policy for the present," Holst told AFTENPOSTEN. "We have already conducted many top level discussions on this matter both with Soviet negotiators and with our allies." [passage omitted]

Three Divisions

"We have many problems with the disarmament agreement with respect to the Soviet Union. Firstly, immediately before the agreement was entered into, the Soviets reclassified three divisions from army to so-called coast guard forces. This concerned one in the south on the Black Sea, one in the Baltic Republics, and one in Arkhangelsk,

and it is especially this last division having become excessively larger than all other comparable Soviet division types which concerns us," says the defense minister.

"The reason that the Soviet Union has changed the name of the forces seems to be that transferring a division to the navy makes its weapons and equipment exempt from the disarmament agreement's limitations because the agreement does not encompass naval forces," says Holst. "But that is an idea which in our opinion is in conflict with the agreement. On this point, there is no room for interpretation of the agreement. According to the spirit and text of the agreement it is of no consequence whether materiel which will be subject to limitation belongs to one or another of the armed services. It is the characteristics of the materiel which determines whether it will be included in the agreement. Article 3 of the disarmament agreement is very clear when it calls for all equipment included within the framework of the agreement within the agreed upon area to be counted toward the 'ceiling' set by the agreement," says Holst.

Supplementary Quotas

If the Soviet attitude should win out, it will mean that the Soviet Union would get a kind of supplementary quota of weapons and materiel close to the Norwegian border.

From the information Holst has received it appears that some of the division's modern T-80 tanks are stored in the Pechenga Valley. The defense minister pointed out that "This is a storage facility which lies far from Arkhangelsk but very near the Norwegian border.... This seems not to inspire confidence and we ask ourselves what the purpose could be."

"We also have another problem and that concerns the so-called naval infantry," says Holst. "The equipment and weapons which belong to these divisions are also included in the agreement. But Moscow disputes this and wants to exempt these forces' weapons from the agreement. The

Soviet Union has two brigades of naval infantry in the North. But according to information we have obtained, the Soviet Union has now stored enough weapons and equipment for an almost doubled number of naval infantry brigades if a decision is reached on this," Holst says. "In the Pechenga Valley, at the Norwegian border, stores for two naval infantry brigades have been built, while equipment for one and a half additional brigades is stored in another place on the Kola Peninsula. But obviously it could also be surmised that this is a method to store equipment outside of the conditions set forth in the disarmament agreement," says Holst.

He says that the force buildup seems to have taken place over the course of the last year and a half and in direct relation to the progress made in the CFE negotiations.

In Holst's opinion, "The Soviet point of view concerning the CFE agreement raises important fundamental questions. It is a basic tenet in international relations that agreements must be lived up to. If this is not the beginning point, there is no use in negotiating," he opines. "If we cannot get the problems I have cited solved within the framework of the agreement, it would dramatically weaken the possibilities for new and broader negotiations on disarmament and arms control."

Wide Support

"If all the equipment which is attributed to the Arkhangelsk division and the two naval infantry brigades on the Kola Peninsula is to be held outside the limitations of the agreement, the agreement could lead to legitimizing a significant arms buildup in areas close to Norway's borders, that is to say areas where from the start there exists a disparate size in forces in favor of the Soviet Union. Naturally enough this creates deep concern in Norway," says Holst, and refers to the fact that in this matter Norway has support from all of the other 21 parties to the CFE agreement aside from the Soviet Union.

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